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CAN’T BUY A THRILL:∗ SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND 
CRIMINALIZING SEX TOYS 
RICHARD GLOVER∗∗ 
 
This Comment explores the split between the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits on the issue of sexual privacy and statutes that ban the sale and 
distribution of sexual devices.  Through a discussion centered around 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Comment argues that the statutes, although perhaps 
silly or repugnant, are not unconstitutional as a matter of privacy, 
substantive due process liberty, equal protection, nor First Amendment 
sexual expression.  In fact, a finding of unconstitutionality could potentially 
do more harm than good to the greater goals of understanding female 
sexuality and providing sexual realization and autonomy.  Those goals will 
be best served, as they have been thus far, via legislative means and further 
scientific research into the role and nature of sex and orgasm in modern 
relationships. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It’s the day for civic freebies as a number of businesses in New York City and across 
the country offer giveaways to voters who have cast their ballots.  Starbucks is giving 
away free cups of coffee, Ben and Jerry’s will give away free scoops of ice cream . . . 
and Krispy Kreme is giving away star-shaped donuts with patriot sprinkles . . . .  
Elsewhere, a more unusual giveaway . . . has drawn a lot of attention.1 
 
∗ Can’t Buy a Thrill is the title of the first album from recording artist Steely Dan.  The 
band was named after “Steely Dan III from Yokohama,” a strap-on dildo referred to in the 
William Burroughs novel, The Naked Lunch. 
∗∗ J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; B.S., University of Tulsa, 2000.  I 
would like to thank my friends and family for their unflagging emotional support, insightful 
comments, and good humor, particularly when I was unwilling or unable to accept any of it.  
Thanks in particular to my parents, my sister, Sarah Kalemeris, Tom Gaeta, Nick Terrell, 
Kevin King, and Kristen Knapp.  
1 Jennifer Lee, Taking Election Freebies Without Guild, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 4, 2008, 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/taking-election-freebies-without-guilt; see 
also Mike Stuckey, Free Sex Toys–and Much More–for Voting, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 3, 2008, 
556 Richard Glover [Vol. 100 
On Election Day, November 4, 2008, Babeland, a sex toy retail chain, 
rewarded voters in New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle with free devices.2  
For men, there was the “Maverick,” “always there to lend a hand,” and 
ready to “buck[] the status quo”;3 for women, there was the “Silver Bullet,” 
because “what our country needs right now [is] a magical solution . . ., a 
great stress-reliever during these troubled economic times.”4  The response 
was overwhelming.5  Babeland was inundated with requests to the point that 
the company had to hire additional staff and ran low on supplies.6  One 
possible explanation for the outstanding success of the promotion is 
summed up in the assertion that “[s]ex crosses party lines.”7  It does not, 
however, appear to cross state lines. 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Virginia presently criminalize the 
marketing and sale of sexual devices—objects created primarily to 
stimulate human genitals.  The Alabama and Mississippi statutes have 
withstood legal challenges in the Eleventh Circuit.  The Virginia statute has 
not yet been challenged.  Texas has a similar ban, but in early 2008, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the statute an unconstitutional 
burden on the people’s substantive due process right to sexual autonomy. 
This Comment explores the split between the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits on the issue of sexual privacy and statutes that ban the sale and 
distribution of sexual devices.  Through a discussion centered around 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Comment argues that the statutes, although perhaps 
silly or repugnant, are not unconstitutional as a matter of privacy, 
substantive due process liberty, equal protection, nor First Amendment 
sexual expression.  In fact, a finding of unconstitutionality could potentially 
do more harm than good to the greater goals of understanding female 
sexuality and providing sexual realization and autonomy.  Those goals will 
be best served, as they have been thus far, via legislative means and further 
scientific research into the role and nature of sex and orgasm in modern 
relationships.  Part II provides a background discussion of the history of 
sexual devices, specifically vibrators,8 and the laws that criminalize their 
 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27455136 (“Just when you thought it was safe to focus on the 
issues in this historic election season . . . .”). 
2 Id. 
3 Babeland Blog, Babeland Rocks the Vote with Free Sex Toys, http://blog.babeland.com/ 
2008/11/03/babeland-rocks-the-vote-with-free-sex-toys (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
4 Id. 
5 See Babeland Blog, Update on the Free Sex Toys, http://blog.babeland.com/2008/ 
11/05/update-on-the-free-sex-toys (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
6 Id. 
7 Stuckey, supra note 1. 
8 Vibrators are highlighted as an example because they are more effective, more 
innocuous, and have a shorter history than most sexual devices.  The choice is appropriate 
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sale in some states.  Part III discusses the case history and decisions of the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle9 and 
Williams v. King,10 respectively.  Part IV provides background to the 
constitutional challenges, discussion of the existing and potential academic 
criticisms of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and analysis of those 
criticisms.  Part V contains concluding remarks.  
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. HYSTERIA, MASSAGE, & VIBRATORS 
Derived from a Greek word meaning “womb,”11 “hysteria” as a 
diagnosis dates back to as early as 2000 B.C.E., and documented treatment 
by “vulvular massage” dates to at least the first century C.E.12  Symptoms 
of hysteria, described in the seventeenth century as “the most common of 
all diseases except fevers,”13 include anxiety, sleeplessness, irritability, 
erotic fantasy, and vaginal lubrication—a set of symptoms some call 
“chronic arousal.”14  Vulvular massage would temporarily treat hysterical 
women by leading to paroxysms, or sudden outbursts of emotion or 
action.15  Hysterical paroxysms are characterized by, among other things, 
“local spasms,” loss of consciousness, flushing of the skin, “voluptuous 
sensations,” embarrassment, confusion, and a very brief loss of control; in 
short, paroxyms are orgasms. 16 
 
given that the relevant discussion is properly focused around the role of orgasm rather than 
the means of achieving it.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.  Furthermore, that even 
vibrators are not constitutionally protected demands the corresponding conclusion that more 
prurient devices are not.  Cf. infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
9 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008). 
10 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 814 (2007). 
11 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). 
[hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY]. 
12 See generally RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: “HYSTERIA,” THE 
VIBRATOR, AND WOMEN’S SEXUAL SATISFACTION (1999) (detailing the history and 
medicalization of the female orgasm).  Hysteria, a supposed revolt of the uterus against 
neglect that “combines in its connotation the pejorative elements of femininity and the 
irrational,” has also been called “womb disease,” “suffocation of the mother,” “uterine 
congestion,” “pelvic inflammation,” “hysteroneurasthenia,” and “frigidity.” Id. at 21. 
13 JOSEPH FRANK PAYNE, THOMAS SYDENHAM 143 (1900). 
14 MAINES, supra note 12, at 8. 
15 Id. at 4; AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY; supra note 11. 
16 MAINES, supra note 12, at 23, 26-34 (describing historical causes and treatments of 
hysteria and awareness of the orgasmic nature of paroxysms).  That hysterics, unlike 
epileptics, felt better after their spells and at no point became incontinent raised suspicions 
of malingering.  Id. at 8. 
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Because “hysterical” women were not achieving orgasm by 
penetration and masturbation was strictly proscribed, medical treatment was 
necessary.17  Furthermore, because it was a treatment rather than a cure, the 
task of vulvular massage had to be regularly repeated.  Physicians found the 
treatment to be an inconvenient, routine, and difficult-to-learn chore,18 often 
leading them to relegate the labor to husbands and midwives.19  That the 
business was lucrative, regular, and repeat, but also annoying, provided 
ample incentive for inventive minds.20  In the 1880s, Dr. Joseph Mortimer 
Granville developed and patented the electromechanical vibrator,21 
revolutionizing treatment of hysteria.22 
By 1952, the American Psychiatric Association officially removed 
hysteria and other related disorders from the list of accepted diagnoses.23  
The vibrator, however, fell from grace almost three decades earlier.24  Prior 
to the late 1920s, the vibrator held an odd social position, a welcomed 
medical innovation separate from similar but more risky technologies like 
the speculum.25  A confluence of amenable social, medical, and 
 
17 See id. at 3; see also ANNE KOEDT, THE MYTH OF THE VAGINAL ORGASM (1970), 
available at http://www.cwluherstory.com/myth-of-the-vaginal-orgasm.html. 
18 One doctor, in 1660, described the technique as “not unlike that children’s game in 
which they try to rub their stomachs with one hand and pat their heads with the other.”  
NATHANIEL HIGHMORE, DE PASSIONE HYSTERICA ET DE AFFECTIONE HYPOCHONDRIACA 76-77 
(1660) (“Necnon in lusu illo puerorum, quo una manu pectus perfricare, altera frontem 
percutere conantur.”). 
19 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 4. 
20 Cf. id. at 4, 67-110 (detailing the various methods of electrical, hydraulic, and 
mechanical manipulation brought to bear on the matter). 
21 See Rachel Maines, Socially Camouflaged Technologies: The Case of the 
Electromechanical Vibrator, in WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY: A READER IN FEMINIST 
SCIENCE STUDIES 223, 225 (Mary Wyer ed., New York 2001). 
22 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 11 (noting the invention is less fatiguing and required 
less skill than manual massage, less expensive than hydriatic or steam-powered technologies, 
and more reliable, portable, and decentralizing than other physical therapies).  The vibrator’s 
invention also heralded a brief medical craze of treating all manner of ailments with 
“[u]ndulatory . . . [t]herapeutics.”  See id. at 97-99.  The Food and Drug Administration 
regulates vibrators “for therapeutic use.”  21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5940 & 5960 (2009). 
23 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, MENTAL DISORDERS DIAGNOSTIC MANUAL 
(1952). 
24 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 20. 
25 See id. at 58 (“Any object or device that traveled the path of the totemic penis into the 
vagina was . . . suspected of having an orgasmically stimulating effect.”); ROBERT 
BRUDENELL CARTER, ON THE PATHOLOGY AND TREATMENT OF HYSTERIA 69 (London, 1853) 
(noting the “remedy is worse than the disease. . . . [Y]oung[,] unmarried women . . . [are] 
reduced by the constant use of the speculum to the mental and moral condition of 
prostitutes . . . asking every medical practitioner . . . to institute an examination of the sexual 
organs”); cf. Joan P. Emerson, Behavior in Private Places: Sustaining Definitions of Reality 
in Gynecological Examinations, 2 RECENT SOC. 74 (1970) (discussing the tension between 
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psychological theories in that era cast the vibrator in an artificially reputable 
light.26  Dominant androcentrism27 implied that “what pleases men sexually 
pleases women generally.”28  Women incapable of achieving strictly 
vaginal orgasms (by most accounts, a majority)29 were in need of therapy.30  
Profound lack of understanding, both physiological and psychological, of 
female sexuality led to confusion about the role of female sex organs and 
the function, if any, of female orgasm.31  Much of this confusion continues 
to this day.32  Androcentrism “created” hysterical women, and their 
“treatment” through massage rather than penetration was viewed as clinical 
rather than sexual.33  The only real hurdle for the vibrator to clear en route 
to routine acceptance was the concern that massage without the assistance 
of a physician would lead to “compulsive masturbation, nymphomania, or 
 
the clinical and the sexual in gynecological exams and detailing the means of enforcing 
clinical perceptions, including norms against “threatening events” such as eye contact, casual 
conversation, and being either too modest or immodest). 
26 Hysteria was thought to have its source in women’s envy of men and failure to accept 
their role as women, and so it was regarded as an anti-male phenomenon.  See Koedt, supra 
note 17 (explaining that this envy stemmed from women’s “inferior appendage”). 
27 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 112 (defining “the androcentric paradigm of sexuality” 
as the idea that “sex consists of penetration (usually of the vagina) to male orgasm”). 
28 Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After 
Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 23 (2004). 
29 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
30 FRANK S. CAPRIO, THE SEXUALLY ADEQUATE FEMALE 64 (1953) (stating that any 
woman that “is incapable of achieving orgasm via coitus” or “prefers clitoral stimulation” 
should be regarded as “suffering from frigidity and requir[ing] . . . assistance”). 
31 See Jane Gerhard, Revisiting “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm”: The Female Orgasm 
in American Sexual Thought and Second Wave Feminism, 26 FEMINIST STUD. 449, 451-52 
(2000) (“[M]edical experts had long debated . . . whether women required orgasm to be 
fertile[,] if orgasm . . . [was] a crucial element of a woman’s physical and mental well-
being[,] the social ramifications of ‘excessive’ female desire, [and] the role the clitoris 
should or could play in healthy female sexuality. . . .  Early nineteenth-century anatomy 
textbooks noted the existence of the clitoris but believed that . . . [it] was passive and 
unimportant . . . .  By the twentieth century, most . . . did not label the clitoris or discuss its 
function.”).  Contra Koedt, supra note 17 (arguing that there was pervasive medical and 
common knowledge of the existence and importance of the clitoris and clitoral stimulation). 
32 See ELISABETH A. LLOYD, THE CASE OF THE FEMALE ORGASM (2005) (analyzing 
twenty-one evolutionary accounts of female orgasm and finding that the only plausible 
explanation is as a byproduct of male orgasm and shared embryonic tissue, a “happy 
accident”).  Recent research continues to challenge common and near universal “knowledge” 
regarding women’s sexuality, often finding that knowledge both untested and wrong.  See, 
e.g., Andrea Virginia Burri et al., Genetic and Environmental Influences on Self-Reported G-
Spots in Women: A Twin Study, 7 J. SEXUAL MED. 1842 (2010). 
33 Cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 267-68 (1992) 
(“[S]ocial relations enforced by the body politic often find . . . justification in the 
organization of the female body itself.”). 
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an outright rejection of intercourse.”34  The advantages of cost and 
convenience would quickly overcome such objections.35 
Before the late 1920s, advertisements for vibrators, marketed to both 
women and their husbands, appeared in publications as commonplace as 
Home Needlework Magazine, Hearst’s, Popular Mechanics, McClure’s, 
and Sears and Roebuck.36  Advertisements made claims of prolonging 
youth, health, and beauty, one of the most explicit claiming that “[a]ll the 
keen relish, the pleasures of youth, will throb within you.”37  Vibrators were 
marketed as regular household appliances; indeed, the only mechanical 
census that mentions their sales specifically classifies them with curling 
irons and hair driers.38  Vibrators were one of the first five appliances to be 
electrified, possibly reflecting consumer interest and priority.39  However, 
social, medical, and psychological paradigm shifts quickly spelled the end 
of the vibrator in the public sphere. 
In the late 1920s, the vibrator began appearing in pornographic films 
as a masturbatory device, exposing it as a threat to the androcentric model.40  
At the same time, Freud’s psychoanalytic theories of “mature” (vaginal) 
versus “immature” (clitoral) female sexuality, originally penned in 1905, 
had become developed and dominant.41  Freud’s account both entrenched 
the androcentric model and exposed the problem vibrators posed to it.  
These events corresponded with the growing awareness in the medical 
 
34 See Gerhard, supra note 31, at 452. 
35 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 100. 
36 See id. at 19-20, 100-08 (listing publications advertising various vibrator technologies 
including the electromechanical vibrator); Maines, supra note 21, at 228-31 (presenting a 
similar, but not identical list). 
37 See Maines, supra note 21, at 228-31. 
38 See id. at 231. 
39 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 100 (noting the electrification of the vibrator preceded 
appliances such as the vacuum cleaner and iron). 
40 See id. at 20; MAINES, supra note 21, at 223 (noting that appearances of vibrators in 
stag films “may have rendered the camouflage inadequate”). 
41 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 43-45 (discussing Freud’s Aetiology of Hysteria—which 
finds hysteria’s origin in “juvenile exposures to sexuality”—and its ascendancy to dominant 
paradigm in the late 1920s); Gerhard, supra note 31, at 452-59 (discussing Freud’s theory of 
the primary importance of vaginal orgasm being linked to men and its development from the 
1930s to the 1960s by Deutsch, Hitschmann & Bergler, and Farnham & Lundberg).  
Astonishingly, dedication to the assumptions of Freud’s model was so deep that some 
researchers even suggested “treating” women by surgically transplanting the clitoris closer to 
the vagina.  See MARIE BONAPARTE, FEMALE SEXUALITY 148 (1953). 
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community that hysteria was so overbroad as a category as to be a 
meaningless diagnosis.42 
By 1930, the vibrator had disappeared from commercial catalogues 
entirely.  It remained underground until its resurgence as a non-medical 
device in 1960s catalogues.43  Since then, the “adult novelty” market has 
ballooned into a $1.5 billion industry.44  In the meantime, second wave 
feminism had begun to dismantle Freudian androcentrism and opened the 
door for clitoral orgasm to re-enter healthy relationships.45  However, the 
debate over the role and importance of female orgasm in modern 
relationships certainly has not been won,46 as evidenced by the recent and 
continued attempts by certain state legislatures to regulate the means by 
which women achieve climax.47  The early twentieth-century association of 
the vibrator with pornography brought about its temporary demise.  Yet, 
removing it from respectable roles and relegating it to seedy sex shops also 
sheltered it from explicit state sanction.  Ironically, the vibrator’s late-
twentieth-century revival, which brought it out from backrooms and 
basements and into national retailers and well-known boutiques,48 has 
hastened its prohibition. 
B. STATE REGULATION OF SEXUAL DEVICES 
The 1980s and ’90s saw several states enact laws prohibiting the 
distribution of sexual devices.  Though as many as eight states once had 
statutes banning sales,49 at present the number of undisputed statutes has 
 
42 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 34 (noting the fracture of hysteria into three related 
“diseases” and the disagreement within the medical community whether sexual indulgence 
and masturbation were symptoms or causes of the conditions). 
43 Id. at 20. 
44 See Lessley Anderson, A Sex Toy Story, CNNMONEY.COM, June 1, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2006/05/01/8375938/index.htm. 
45 See Gerhard, supra note 31, at 459-68 (explaining Koedt’s and others’ incorporation of 
work by sexologists like Kinsey et al. and Masters & Johnson into a feminist critique of the 
Freudian model). 
46 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 112 (“What is impressive, however, is that the 
androcentric paradigm of sexuality . . . is a fixed point in the otherwise shifting sands of 
Western medical opinion.”). 
47 See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
48 See, e.g., Kristin Fasullo, Beyond Lawrence v. Texas: Crafting a Fundamental Right to 
Sexual Privacy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 3013-16 (2009) (detailing the popularity of 
devices, including attention from Oprah Winfrey as well as offerings from retailers like 
Amazon.com, Walmart, and Target). 
49 See infra note 50.  But see Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology Full Circle: A History of 
Anti-Vibrator Legislation in the United States, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326, 330 (2006) 
(noting that the number of states with statutes that prohibit the sale of sexual devices is 
“almost impossible to assess accurately at any one time, due to spotty enforcement and the 
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dwindled to three.50  The stories emerging from the states with invalidated 
laws are relatively consistent: the invalidity of each law stems from 
constitutional technicalities, while the underlying ability to regulate the sale 
of these devices is either never addressed or simply presumed to exist.51 
The Colorado statute, for example, contained a blanket proscription of 
all sexual devices.52  The Colorado Supreme Court held that, because it 
lacked a medical exception, the statute infringed the privacy right of those 
seeking “legitimate” use.53  The Kansas statute also failed to create a 
medical exception, again leading to invalidation on privacy grounds.54  In a 
related but distinct analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that 
because the Louisiana statute contained no medical exception, it failed 
rational basis review.55  The Georgia statute contained a blanket ban on 
advertising despite providing a medical exception for sale.56  The state’s 
supreme court held that because this amounted to a per se ban on 
 
fact that these laws are continually in flux”).  Some estimates are as high as fourteen.  Id. at 
330-31.  Virginia’s statute appears to be one that is unenforced.  Cf. Allison Klein, In Old 
Town, the Sex Shop Is a Kiss-Off, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2009, at A1 (suggesting “[t]he city 
cannot act because the store is complying with the law” despite the fact that the store 
markets and sells sexual devices). 
50 See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (1975 & Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-
101 (Supp. 1984), invalidated by People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, 
Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80 (2003), invalidated by This 
That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 439 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2006); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (2003), invalidated by State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1 (2003), invalidated by State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64 
(La. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (2000); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21 & 43.23 
(Vernon 2003), invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 
2008), reh’g en banc denied, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. 18.2-373(3) 
(2000).  At least one municipality had a similar statute.  See ST. LOUIS REV. CODE 
§ 11.54.010 (2008), invalidated by Postscript Enter. v. Whaley, 658 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 
1981). 
51 See, e.g., Postscript Enter., 658 F.2d at 1254 n.6 (“We assume, without having to 
decide, that the City of St. Louis may, through a properly drawn ordinance, restrict the sale 
of items which enable, aid, or encourage private consensual sexual behavior among adults.”). 
52 See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370. 
53 Id. (noting that FDA regulations implied legitimate therapeutic use and that the statute 
as written “equate[s] sex with obscenity,” but declining to reach whether there is a broader 
constitutional privacy interest violated by the statute). 
54 See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031 (citing to and agreeing with Tooley, [but noting that the 
statute permissibly defined “obscene” beyond community standards because Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), does not apply to devices). 
55 See Brenan, 772 So. 2d at 74 (noting that the Miller test does not necessarily apply to 
devices, but applying the Miller test to find devices not always obscene, thereby eliminating 
any state interest that could surpass therapeutic interest under rational basis review). 
56 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80 (2003), invalidated by This That & The Other Gift & 
Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 439 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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advertising, the statute violated the First Amendment.57  In the end, there is 
no clear trend in exactly to what these statutes object or what or whom they 
are designed to protect.  The statutory language variously focuses on 
function, form, or both.  The lack of uniformity becomes particularly clear 
when one considers regulation going forward.  For example, it is thoroughly 
confounding to consider how (or even if) state legislatures will respond to 
devices such as Dr. Stuart Meloy’s Orgasmatron, which is nothing more 
than electrodes and a box, designed to directly stimulate the spinal cord 
rather than the genitals.58 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: WILLIAMS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Williams v. Pryor,59 in 1999, was the first step in a fairly complex case 
history that spans eight years and two attorneys general, involving three 
separate trial court hearings, two reversals and remands, and two denials of 
rehearing.60  Both users and vendors challenged Alabama’s obscene 
materials statute, amended in 1998 to prohibit the sale of devices primarily 
for the stimulation of human genital organs.61  The challenge did not seek 
recognition of a fundamental right; rather, it claimed the statute burdened 
and violated rights to privacy and personal autonomy derived from the 
Fourteenth Amendment and bore no rational relationship to proper 
legislative purpose.62  The district court found that the plaintiffs’ interests 
did not warrant strict scrutiny, but held that the statute did not even pass 
rational basis review.63  Specifically, the court found that, although the 
state’s conceivable interests (banning public displays of obscene materials, 
banning the commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism for its own 
 
57 See This That & The Other, 439 F.3d at 1284-85 (suggesting that the state’s failure to 
argue a limiting construction of the statute, rather than an inherent flaw in the law, mandated 
invalidation of the entire statute). 
58 See Regina Nuzzo, Call Him Doctor “Orgasmatron”, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, 
http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-he-orside11feb11,1,7473561.story. 
59 Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999), rev’d, 240 F.3d 
944 (11th Cir. 2001).  
60 Some of this complexity stems from the fact that the complaint originated prior to, but 
terminated after, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
See, e.g., Williams I, at 1279, 1282-83 (referencing Carey v. Population Services 
International, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977), for the proposition that the Court has not 
decided whether states can regulate sexual behavior among adults).  
61 See Williams I, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257; ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (1975 & Supp. 
2003). 
62 See Williams I, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1260, 1275. 
63 Id. at 1283-84, 1287-93. 
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sake, and banning commerce in obscene material) were all legitimate, the 
statute was overbroad in achieving those interests.64 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that the district court 
did not apply sufficient deference in its rational basis analysis.65  
Specifically, the panel found the state’s interest in regulating public 
morality by discouraging autonomous sex was served, if only 
incrementally, by a complete ban on commerce in devices for autonomous 
use.66  The panel also found that the district court misapplied three 
important Supreme Court precedents regarding levels of scrutiny.67  
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that, regardless of how misguided the 
Alabama legislature may have been, the statute still survives rational basis 
review.68 
However, after affirming the district court’s decision that the facial 
challenge on fundamental rights grounds was inadequate, the Eleventh 
Circuit remanded the as-applied challenge.69  On remand, the district court, 
in contradiction to its finding in Williams I, found that states traditionally 
refrained from regulating the private sexual behavior of both married and 
unmarried couples.70  The court charted a history from “open spaces and 
free expression” prior to the seventeenth century,71 through Puritan control 
of sexual conduct,72 the demise of church influence and the rise of family 
and neighborhood enforcement in the eighteenth century,73 the advent of 
Victorian prudism in the nineteenth century, into the Comstock Act and the 
 
64 Id. at 1285-87, 1288-93 (finding that commerce in sexual devices does not require 
public display, that such devices are often used within marriages and relationships rather 
than for auto-eroticism, and that many such devices are not obscene). 
65 Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001). 
66 Id. at 949-50 (noting that the legislation might even survive intermediate scrutiny but 
not addressing that question). 
67 Id. at 950-52 (noting that the standard for overbreadth derived from Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78 (1987), is specific to prison regulations; that Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), was not based on rational basis review; and that decisions addressing prejudicial 
classification under equal protection are inappropriate when applied to a case involving 
neither classification nor equal protection). 
68 Id. at 952 (“The Constitution presumes that . . . improvident decisions will eventually 
be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted 
no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”). 
69 Id. at 955-56 (criticizing the trial court for failing to undertake a Glucksberg analysis 
of “deeply rooted” and “central liberty” with regard to the user plaintiffs). 
70 Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (mem.) 
(taking plaintiff’s presented history as correct because of the state’s concession of the point). 
71 Id. at 1278-80 (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1990)). 
72 Id. (noting the Puritans’ distinction between “proper sexual expression” within 
marriage and “sexual transgression” outside of marriage). 
73 Id. at 1280-82 (noting a “gradual although irregular decline in sexual oppression”). 
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invention of the electromechanical vibrator,74 and finishing with the sexual 
revolution and the re-emergence of substantive due process in the twentieth 
century.75  At all times throughout this history, married couples enjoyed 
sexual freedom, either through the lack of statutes or non-enforcement of 
existing statutes.  At later points in this history, that freedom was extended 
to unmarried couples, leading the district court to conclude that there is an 
“established pattern of non-interference with virtually all consenting adult 
sexual behavior.”76  Having effectively announced a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy, the district court went on to find the statute was not 
narrowly tailored enough to meet a compelling state interest.77 
Between the time of the decision of Williams III and its hearing on 
appeal,78 the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas.79  The Eleventh Circuit read the ambiguous Lawrence opinion very 
narrowly, characterizing any hints at a fundamental right as “scattered 
dicta.”80  The court therefore relied heavily on prior jurisprudence, noting 
that past protections of personal autonomy “[do] not warrant the sweeping 
conclusion that any and all important, intimate decisions are so protected,” 
and found no Supreme Court precedent for recognizing a free-standing right 
to sexual privacy.81  In fact, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the Court has 
seen repeated opportunities to recognize such a right and has invariably 
declined.82 
The Eleventh Circuit then performed its own Glucksberg analysis for 
declaring a new fundamental right.83  Despite having framed the right at 
issue in Williams I as “an individual’s liberty to use sexual devices when 
engaging in lawful, private, sexual activity,”84 the district court had 
abandoned this “careful formulation” of the right in favor of the overbroad 
 
74 Id. at 1282-89 (acknowledging the Comstock laws as an aberration of the era, and 
assuming the exception of vibrators from Comstock laws was evidence of “legislative 
respect for sexual privacy in the marital relationship”). 
75 Id. at 1289-94 (taking as a sign of the times, inter alia, the fact that the Model Penal 
Code excepts  deviate sexual intercourse between consenting adults from criminal sanction). 
76 Id. at 1295. 
77 Id. at 1303-07. 
78 Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). 
79 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  Lawrence is discussed at length infra Parts IV.A.1-3. 
80 Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1236-37. 
81 Id. at 1235 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997)). 
82 Id. at 1235-36 (noting that Lawrence did not apply fundamental rights analysis, 
ultimately applying rational basis review). 
83 Id. at 1239-50.  The so-called “Glucksberg Two-Step” requires a “careful description” 
of the asserted liberty interest and inquires whether a right or liberty is objectively “deeply 
rooted in the nation’s history and traditions.”  See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.  The 
Glucksberg analysis is discussed infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. 
84 Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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“right to sexual privacy.”85  The circuit court warned that such a 
formulation, with no defined scope or bounds save for confinement to 
consenting adults, would encompass activities like prostitution, obscenity, 
and adult incest.86  Instead, the circuit chose to reframe the right, in line 
with the formulation it originally accepted in Williams II, as one to sell, 
purchase, and use sexual devices.87 
Turning to the historical analysis required by the second prong of 
Glucksberg, the circuit court found four errors in the district court’s inquiry.  
First, the district court’s misframing of the right at issue as one of “sexual 
privacy” led to an irrelevant exploration of the history of sex in America.88  
Second, the district court, in its analysis of history and tradition, placed too 
much emphasis on contemporary practices and attitudes.89  Third, the 
district court incorrectly equated a history of non-interference with the 
asserted right with a history of protection of that right.90  Finally, the district 
court’s reliance solely on the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert and the 
state’s putative concessions was flawed.91  The circuit court reversed the 
district court’s ruling and remanded the case for consideration of the effect 
of Lawrence’s overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick92 on the legitimacy of 
regulating sexual morality.93 
On this remand, the district court responded to the circuit court’s 
repeated admonitions and found that, because the statute facially applies to 
people of many lifestyles, it does not conflict with Lawrence’s invalidation 
 
85 Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1239 & n.10 (remarking that such a mistake is understandable 
given the imprecise language utilized in Williams II, 240 F.3d at 953). 
86 Id. at 1239-40. 
87 Id. at 1242 (acknowledging that the minimum, “careful” formulation is merely one of 
selling and purchasing, but noting that the commercial burden is “tantamount to restrictions 
on the use” and so requiring use analysis as well). 
88 Id. at 1242-43 (noting that the correct inquiry would be one into the treatment of 
sexual devices). 
89 Id. at 1243-44 & n.14 (noting that Glucksberg’s reference to contemporary practice 
was a non-essential confirmation of its historical finding of no deeply-rooted right rather 
than, as here, a contradiction of it, and observing that the contemporary trend actually 
“proves too much” by confirming the court’s deference to democratic process). 
90 Id. at 1244-45 (noting that by finding a negative rather than affirmative protection, the 
district court inverted the Glucksberg inquiry in a way that would support a fundamental 
freedom to pollute, discriminate, and commit marital rape as well as give a perverse 
incentive to legislatures to regulate all aspects of life). 
91 Id. at 1246-50 (noting that the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony often amounts to bare and 
biased assertion without independent verification, or statements in contradiction with the 
expert’s previous academic works; also noting that the state did not, as the trial court claimed 
and relied on, concede this historical treatment). 
92 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
93 Williams IV, 378 F.3d. at 1250. 
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of a statute based on its impact on homosexual lifestyles.94  On final appeal, 
in by far the shortest opinion in this line of cases, the circuit court finally 
affirmed, emphasizing that the statute here involved public, commercial 
activity as opposed to Lawrence’s invalidation of prohibitions on a type of 
private, non-commercial activity.95  The circuit court’s switch from 
focusing on private use in Williams II and Williams IV to focusing on public 
commerce in Williams VI can be explained by the change in relevant 
question from the existence of a fundamental right to the existence of a 
rational basis after Lawrence.96 
The Williams saga ultimately focused on a proposed fundamental right 
to use sexual devices in private sexual activity and the burden imposed on 
that interest by regulating public commerce in those devices.  The Williams 
courts concluded that no such right exists and, therefore, that the state’s 
commercial regulation easily passed rational basis review.  The Fifth 
Circuit would address the same questions concerning a substantially similar 
statute exactly one year later. 
B. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: RELIABLE CONSULTANTS, INC. V. EARLE 
In Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,97 the Fifth Circuit heard a 
declaratory challenge on Fourteenth Amendment grounds to a Texas statute 
that criminalized the buying, selling, advertising, giving, or lending of any 
device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation.98  To begin, the court 
noted the potential for several presumably non-prurient interests in sexual 
devices, including situations where one partner is physically unable to 
engage in intercourse or has a contagious disease, where the devices may be 
 
94 See Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (noting 
that none of the targeted devices represent implements common to the homosexual lifestyle, 
nor does the law target a specific, identifiable class for discrimination or harm out of simple 
hostility). 
95 See Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007). 
96 Compare Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1242 (“[O]ur analysis must be framed not simply in 
terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and buy sexual devices, but whether 
it protects a right to use such devices.”) (emphasis added), with Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 
1323 (“[W]e do not read Lawrence, the overruling of Bowers, or the Lawrence court’s 
reliance on Justice Stevens’s dissent, to have rendered public morality altogether illegitimate 
as a rational basis.”) (emphasis added). 
97 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008). 
98 See id. at 740; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21, 43.23 (Vernon 2003), invalidated by 
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).  The case also presented a 
First Amendment challenge, but the court did not reach that issue because doing so was 
unnecessary to invalidate the statute in this case and “it may be premature.”  See Reliable 
Consultants, 517 F.3d at 747. 
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necessary for therapeutic needs, or where they facilitate the decision to 
refrain from premarital intercourse.99 
Next, the court turned its attention to the impact of Lawrence on its 
substantive due process analysis.100  Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth 
Circuit found no need to formulate the right at stake as one involving either 
the sale, purchase, or use of sexual devices.101  Indeed, the circuit court 
determined that the Lawrence Court had already defined and defended the 
right at stake: the right “to be free from governmental intrusion regarding 
‘the most private of human contact, sexual behavior.’”102  Unlike the 
Alabama statute, which merely prohibited commerce in such devices, the 
Texas statute prohibited lending and giving, thereby eliminating arguments 
that the statute affected only public, commercial conduct.103  The court 
found that the state’s interest in public morality could not justify so 
significant an intrusion into “adult consensual intimacy in the home.”104  
Finally, the court found that the state’s interest in protecting minors and 
unwilling adults from exposure to the devices and their advertisements is 
not rationally connected to the statute, particularly since an unwilling 
recipient would first have to affirmatively seek out the device in order to be 
exposed to it.105 
Writing in dissent, Judge Hawkins suggested that, rather than the 
majority’s approach of sidestepping scrutiny, Lawrence demands a rational 
basis standard of review.106  Chief Judge Jones’s later dissent from the 
court’s denial of rehearing en banc expanded on that position, noting that 
“the Reliable majority exploited [Lawrence’s] broad and vague statements 
about liberty while ignoring the Court’s self-imposed limits” in a manner 
that “trivializes that decision and ‘demeans the importance of its holding 
 
99 Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 742. 
100 Id. at 743-47 (finding that Lawrence majority rested entirely on substantive due 
process grounds and applying the Lawrence analysis to the Texas statute). 
101 Id. at 743. 
102 Id. at 743-44 (finding substantial similarity—prohibition of a particular sexual act—
between the law in Bowers and the law here (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 
(2003))). 
103 Id. at 744. 
104 Id. at 745 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564).  In a footnote, however, the court 
observed that its holding “in no way overtly expresses or implies that public morality can 
never be a constitutional justification for a law.”  Id. at 564 n.36. 
105 Id. at 746. 
106 Id. at 749 (Hawkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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which deals a fatal blow to criminal laws aimed at punishing 
homosexuals.’”107 
Judge Garza’s separate dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, 
before questioning the Supreme Court’s method of announcing 
unenumerated rights, criticized the Reliable majority for misunderstanding 
the right announced in Lawrence and for extending that right far beyond its 
limits in several ways.108  First, although the Reliable majority recognized 
that the Lawrence Court did not announce a new fundamental right, by 
ignoring levels of scrutiny, it created “something outside of substantive due 
process jurisprudence entirely”: “a commercial right ex nihilo to promote 
sexual devices.”109  Second, Judges Garza and Elrod (in separate dissents) 
thought the Reliable majority overstepped its bounds by overruling a prior 
statement of a circuit panel and a line of rulings by the Supreme Court.110  
Specifically, the Reliable court overruled, sub silentio, the Fifth Circuit’s 
prior precedent upholding the constitutionality of the same statute in Red 
Bluff Drive Inn, Inc. v. Vance.111  Moreover, that precedent stemmed from a 
direct line of Supreme Court cases permitting obscenity regulations, such as 
Sewell v. Georgia,112 thereby placing the Reliable majority in violation of 
the Court’s admonition that “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct 
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other 
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which 
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.”113 
 
107 Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 356 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (Jones, 
C.J., Jolly, Smith, Clement & Owen, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(quoting Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir. 2005) (Evans, J., concurring)). 
108 Id. at 358 (Garza, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
109 Id. at 359. 
110 Id. at 360 n.5; id. at 365 (Elrod, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(citing Lowry v. Texas A & M University System, 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997), for the 
rule that a previous panel decision may only be overruled by “‘a subsequent decision of the 
Supreme Court or by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc’”; noting also the creation of a circuit 
split with the Eleventh and, arguably, Tenth Circuits).  
111 Reliable Consultants, 538 F.3d at 360 n.5 (Garza, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
112 435 U.S. 982 (1978). 
113 Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989)); accord United States v. Harb, No. 2:07-CR-426 TS, 2009 WL 499467, at *2 
(D. Utah Feb. 27, 2009) (declining to extend substantive due process right in Lawrence 
beyond its facts, noting the Supreme Court must further interpret Lawrence before the lower 
courts can overrule binding precedent). 
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C. STATE COURTS 
The Alabama statute, upheld by the Eleventh Circuit, withstood 
another challenge, this time in front of the Alabama Supreme Court, on 
both United States and Alabama constitutional claims.114  After lengthy 
recitation and discussion of the Williams and Reliable courts’ positions, the 
Alabama court adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Lawrence 
wholesale.115  The Alabama court specifically emphasized the public/private 
and commercial/noncommercial distinctions, as well as the lack of a 
targeted class.116 
Conversely, two Texas courts have balked at utilizing the Fifth 
Circuit’s announcement of a fundamental right to sexual privacy.117  In 
Varkonyi v. State,118 the defendant had been convicted of promotion or 
possession of obscene materials with intent to promote.119  He claimed on 
appeal that the state’s definition of “promote” criminalized his 
constitutionally protected possession of obscene material in the privacy of 
his own home.120  The appeals court noted that the opinion in Reliable did 
not address the line of Supreme Court cases holding that the constitutionally 
protected right to private possession of obscene material does not give rise 
to a correlative right to receive those materials or sell or transmit them to 
others.121  Though merely declining to extend the Reliable holding,122 the 
appellate court did not distinguish in any detail the restrictions on 
commerce in privately acceptable materials that are alternatively acceptable 
and unacceptable based, ostensibly, on nothing more than whether the 
material is a sexual device or merely “obscenity.”123 
In Villarreal v. State,124 the defendant was convicted of violating 
Texas’s statute banning distribution of sexual devices.125  The Texas 
 
114 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, No. 1070531, 2009 WL 2903458 
(Ala. Sept. 11, 2009). 
115 Id. at *22. 
116 Id. 
117 See Varkonyi v. State, 276 S.W.3d 27 (Tex. App. 2008) (declining to extend a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy); Villarreal v. State, 276 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App. 2008) 
(declining to follow the Fifth Circuit’s announcement of same). 
118 276 S.W.3d at 27.  
119 Id. at 37. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 38 (“We decline to follow Reliable Consultants because we do not read 
Lawrence as overruling this line of authority.”). 
123 One such distinction, for example, is that some obscene materials, like child 
pornography, may necessarily harm others in their production. 
124 276 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App. 2008). 
125 Id. at 206. 
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appeals court noted that it is not bound to follow the constitutional 
pronouncements of federal circuit courts (including the Reliable decision), 
but it is bound to follow the finding of constitutionality of its state courts.126  
After noting several cases where Texas courts reluctantly applied the 
statute, the Villarreal court declined to follow the Reliable majority.127  The 
court quoted one appellate chief justice’s expression of frustration with his 
constitutional constraints by stating: “Here we go raising the price of dildos 
again.  Since this appears to be the law in Texas[,] I must concur.”128 
The limitations on the court in Villarreal will not be addressed any 
time soon, as the Texas attorney general has declined to file a writ of 
certiorari in Reliable.129  Until the Supreme Court further addresses sexual 
privacy, Texas courts are bound to follow their state courts’ constitutional 
precedents.  Violators of the statute who receive prison sentences can access 
the federal courts, which are bound by the Reliable decision, by writ of 
habeas corpus.130  Whether Texas chooses to deal with this by repeal, non-
enforcement, amendment, or strictly issuing fines is yet to be seen.131 
The issue skirted in Varkonyi is even more troublesome.  If, as the 
Fifth Circuit contends, Lawrence eliminated morality as a stand-alone 
rational basis, there is a direct conflict between this new jurisprudence and a 
long line of the Court’s First Amendment doctrine.  These issues demand 
the attention of the Supreme Court. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As of this writing, the academic response to the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuit lines of reasoning has universally embraced Reliable and rejected 
Williams.132  These responses generally present theories of substantive due 
 
126 Id. at 208-09 (agreeing with the Reliable court’s ruling but conforming to controlling 
authority) (citing Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), and Ex parte 
Dave, 220 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. App. 2007)). 
127 Id. at 209. 
128 Id. at 207 (quoting Regalado v. State, 872 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Tex. App. 1994) (Brown, 
C.J., concurring)). 
129 See Slav Kandyba, Texas AG Drops Adult Toy Case Appeal, XBIZ NEWS, Nov. 4, 
2008, http://www.xbiz.com/news/101202. 
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). 
131 If Texas’s reaction to Lawrence is any indication, repeal is not likely.  The statute that 
Lawrence declared unconstitutional is still on the books.  See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 21.06 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008). 
132 See, e.g., Lindemann, supra note 49.  The author excludes case notes that merely 
characterize existing law, such as Douglas E. Nauman, Where Sexual Privacy Meets Public 
Morality: How Williams v. King Is Instructive for the Fourth Circuit in Applying Public 
Morality as a Legitimate State Interest After Lawrence v. Texas, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127 
(2006). 
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process, similar to the Fifth Circuit’s formulation in Reliable, that support a 
fundamental right to sexual autonomy.  Two other potential criticisms, 
relying on equal protection and the First Amendment, have been hinted at in 
the literature.  This Part briefly outlines the doctrines of substantive due 
process, equal protection, and free expression, presents the salient criticisms 
and their shortcomings, and discusses hidden pitfalls in the fight for sexual 
autonomy.  Part IV.A argues that, under substantive due process 
jurisprudence, both the Fifth and Elevenths Circuits in Williams and 
Reliable, respectively, likely got the outcome, if not the analysis or remedy, 
correct.  The difference in outcome between the two courts can easily be 
ascribed to the fact that the Texas statute burdens use in a way that the 
Alabama statute does not.  Part IV.B argues that, though the anti-sexual 
device statutes have a disparate and detrimental impact on women and 
sexual minorities, current equal protection doctrine cannot vindicate their 
rights, nor should it without further research.  Finally, Part IV.C argues that, 
while the Court’s language in Lawrence is vague enough to provide some 
indication of a link between free speech and sexual expression, that link is 
far too tenuous to affect the outcome of these cases. 
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution prohibit the 
federal and state governments, respectively, from “depriv[ing] any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”133  Until the late 
nineteenth century, the Court acknowledged only a procedural dimension to 
due process, guaranteeing fundamental fairness.  Gradually, the Court 
began to acknowledge that due process has at least a minimal substantive 
end as well: the requirement that the government act by means of valid 
laws.134  This early formulation of substantive due process sought to 
delineate some independent boundaries of government power and, as such, 
rested as much on agency as due process.135  Lochner-era Courts, often 
focused on redistributive economic policies as much as the bounds of the 
police power, identified the boundaries generally with the concept that 
 
133 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
134 See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1332-33 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“[B]y 1868, a recognized meaning of the qualifying phrase ‘of law’ was substantive.”).  But 
see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980) (calling substantive due process 
an oxymoronic contradiction in terms akin to “green pastel redness”); Kermit Roosevelt III, 
Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 984 
(2006) (calling the formulation a pleonasm). 
135 Roosevelt, supra note 134, at 984. 
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“governmental action must serve a public purpose [or] interest, rather than 
benefiting (or burdening) a discrete segment of the population.”136   
This early era and its acknowledgement of a substantive component of 
due process ended abruptly in the late 1930s.137  What survived was the 
basic concept that the benefits of a law should exceed its burdens.138  The 
Court began to defer to the legislature’s competence in identifying the 
boundaries of those benefits and burdens, except instances in which the 
legislature could not be trusted to do so because political checks would not 
ensure adequate representation of the public’s interests.139  Hence, in 1938, 
the Court, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,140 set out the specific 
boundary where the Court will question the government’s otherwise 
constitutional actions: when those actions burden the rights of the accused, 
the political process, or the rights of “discrete and insular minorities.”141  
The Court later began protecting fundamental rights that are not explicitly 
in the text of the Constitution,142 but are part of a shared American 
tradition143 and essential to the concept of liberty.144  These include the right 
“to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s 
children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, . . . to 
abortion[,] to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment[,]”145 and to 
engage in adult, consensual sodomy in the privacy of one’s home.146  If the 
 
136 Id. at 986-87. 
137 See id. at 988-89 (suggesting that substantive due process collapsed under the weight 
of the economic turmoil of the 1930s and the realization that identifying partial state 
interventions in the market was impossible). 
138 Id. at 992. 
139 Id. 
140 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
141 See id. at 153 n.4.  That Carolene Products became the foundation of the Equal 
Protection Clause doctrine rather than substantive due process is a remnant of the Court’s 
attempt in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), to reverse incorporate the Equal 
Protection Clause into Fifth Amendment due process.  See Roosevelt, supra note 134, at 
997-98.  This move has been characterized as “‘gibberish both syntactically and 
historically’” because it would make the Fourteenth Amendment’s separate guarantees of 
equal protection and due process redundant as well as force a text from 1791 to 
“incorporate” a text from 1868.  Id. (quoting ELY, supra note 134, at 32). 
142 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
143 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
144 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937). 
145 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted). 
146 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  A common misconception is that these 
rights are decidedly liberal in nature.  For criticisms of that view, see Bradley P. Jacob, 
Griswold and the Defense of Traditional Marriage, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1199, 1213 (2007) 
(“[J]ust about everyone, regardless of political perspective, can identify some rights that 
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Court finds that a fundamental right is burdened by a statute, it will apply a 
strict scrutiny review, which is generally fatal to the statute.147  Strict 
scrutiny requires that the statute be a narrowly tailored, least restrictive 
means of achieving a compelling government interest.148  If the Court finds 
no fundamental right, it will apply a rational basis review, which is 
generally not fatal to the statute,149 requiring only that the statute be 
rationally related150 to a legitimate government interest.151 
The protection of unenumerated rights remains controversial.  Because 
those rights and liberties are found outside the plain text of the Constitution, 
critics are skeptical of the legitimacy of the rights and the Court’s ability to 
identify them.152  The concern is that “‘liberty’ . . . can be read in diverse 
ways, and there is no particular reason to trust judicial readings, even or 
perhaps especially if they are morally infused.”153  The Court has openly 
acknowledged and shared the concern that, without strict limitation, 
fundamental rights will merely reflect the “predilections” of the current 
members of the Court.154  The Court has addressed this concern with an 
 
seem so incredibly important as to require judicial application.”); Mark Tushnet, Can You 
Watch Unenumerated Rights Drift?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 209 (2006). 
147 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).  Contra Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An 
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006) 
(surveying every strict scrutiny decision published by the district, circuit, and Supreme 
Courts from 1990 to 2003 and finding that strict scrutiny is not nearly as fatal as generally 
believed, with laws surviving more than thirty percent of challenges). 
148 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bost. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). 
149 See Gunther, supra note 147, at 8 (“[M]inimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in 
fact.”). 
150 See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (stating that 
legislation will be upheld under rational basis review “if there is any reasonably conceivable 
state of facts that could provide a rational basis” and “where there are ‘plausible reasons’ for 
Congress’ action, ‘our inquiry is at an end’” (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 
166, 179 (1980))); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) 
(“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims . . . .  It is enough 
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
151 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (noting that rational 
basis review requires “legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means”). 
152 See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 134, at 993. 
153 Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543, 1567-68 
(2008). 
154 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality) (citing 
Lochner-era economic due process as exemplary of the pitfalls of judge-made rights, but 
noting that history “counsels caution and restraint[,] . . . [not] abandonment”); see also id. at 
544 (White, J., dissenting) (“The Judiciary . . . comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals 
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institutional reluctance to announce substantive due process rights155 and an 
analytic method that requires both a “careful description” of the 
fundamental right,156 and that the right be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition”157 and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 
such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”158  
The Court has, at times, taken a more moderate approach of “reasoned 
judgment,” identifying rights and balancing them against competing state 
interests through philosophical analysis and political-moral reasoning.159  
Lawrence v. Texas added a new wrinkle by noting that the historical inquiry 
is merely a starting point of the analysis and is not necessarily dispositive 
on its own.160  In one interpretation, the Lawrence Court based its decision 
on “evolving national values.”161  Which method is deployed in any given 
case appears to be unpredictable.162  However, because Lawrence is the 
most recent case on point, it will be the focus of this analysis. 
 
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or 
even the design of the Constitution.”). 
155 See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[T]he Court has 
always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts 
for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended [and so the 
Court] exercise[s] the utmost care whenever . . . asked to break new ground in this field.”). 
156 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).  This “careful statement” has sometimes 
been characterized as requiring definition of the right at “the most specific level at which a 
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”  
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989).  The careful statement requirement 
has been criticized as allowing courts to pick and choose between competing accurate 
descriptions of the activity involved based on the desired outcome of the case.  See, e.g., 
Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1490 (2008). 
157 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503. 
158 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937); see also Robert C. Post, 
Foreward: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 89 (2003) (describing this “approach as “focus[ing] on the forms of liberty 
prerequisite for personal dignity and autonomy”).  For a general discussion of fundamental 
inadequacies of the focus on history and tradition, see Sunstein, supra note 153. 
159 See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
63, 98-106 (2006) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992)). 
160 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003); cf. Herald, supra note 28, at 30 
(“Rather than attack the standard directly as one easily manipulated, Kennedy simply 
manipulates the standard, deftly showing by example the dangerous plasticity of the tradition 
and history doctrine.”). 
161 See Conkle, supra note 159 at 115-33; Michael J. Hooi, Substantive Due Process: Sex 
Toys After Lawrence, 60 FLA. L. REV. 507, 509-10 (2008).  For general discussions of the 
impact of Lawrence on substantive due process, see H.N. HIRSCH, THE FUTURE OF GAY 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2005). 
162 See Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 SMU L. REV. 1557, 1560-61 (2008) 
(“To this end, the Court has constructed various interpretive methods, which are then 
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1. Scrutinizing Lawrence 
The Lawrence decision has been characterized as a “maddening,”163 
“remarkably opaque” opinion that “raises a number of puzzles”;164 one that 
is “easy to read, but difficult to pin down”;165 and as notable for what it 
failed to say as for what it actually did say.166  Because the opinion in 
Lawrence did not carefully describe a fundamental liberty interest,167 nor 
specify a level of scrutiny,168 many have debated its actual method and 
meaning.169  Some read Lawrence as applying rational basis review to 
invalidate the law,170 which merely complicates similar issues by never 
reaching and answering the question of fundamental rights.171  Others 
suggest that the Court applied a form of strict scrutiny.172  Still others argue 
that the Court applied a balancing test that is neither strict nor rational.173  
 
engaged irregularly or simply discarded.” (citing, inter alia, the penumbra approach to 
privacy as being discarded less than a decade after its announcement)). 
163 Michael P. Allen, The Underappreciated First Amendment Importance of Lawrence 
v. Texas, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2008). 
164 Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?  Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, 
and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 29, 45 (2003). 
165 Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (2004); see also 
Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75 (2003) 
(noting that, because the “lack of clarity concerning antecedents in the opinion goes beyond 
the merely grammatical,” the language and reasoning “frequently point in a direction” that, 
upon review, “reverses itself or dissolves into ambiguity”); Herald, supra note 28, at 29 
(“The opinion has language that gives and then takes, sometimes in the same sentence.”).  
166 See Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence’s Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1180 (2004) 
(calling Lawrence “poor judicial craftsmanship” and noting “[i]ts reasoning is obscure, and it 
lays down no clear rule”); see also Herald, supra note 28, at 32 n.212 (suggesting that the 
Lawrence doctrine parallels the discarded obscenity doctrine of “I know it when I see it”).  
But cf. Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 746 
(2010) (arguing that, after Lawrence, what was once haphazardly protected under privacy 
has now correctly shifted to protection under liberty, with either negative repercussions for 
the use of sexual devices if pursued under privacy or trivializing consequences for gay rights 
if pursued under liberty); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
1447, 1449 (2004) (“Like Loving, Lawrence marks a crystallization of doctrine.”). 
167 See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 n.6 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“Rather, the constitutional liberty interests on which the Court relied were invoked, 
not with ‘careful description,’ but with sweeping generality.”). 
168 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
169 See Herald, supra note 28, at 30 (“Lawrence was not written to praise liberty, but to 
bury Bowers. . . .  Thus, although it is clear that Bowers is dead, it is unclear what doctrine 
lives on.”). 
170 See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51 n.5 (1st Cir. 2008). 
171 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
172 See Cook, 528 F.3d at 51 n.6. 
173 See id. at 51 n.7. 
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At least one scholar even suggests that Lawrence was as much about 
procedure as substance.174 
As the circuit split in Reliable and Williams clearly demonstrates, 
Lawrence is a blunt enough instrument to be both the right and wrong tool 
for the job: 
By its language, the opinion’s protection seems to be limited to (1) consensual acts, 
(2) involving adult humans, (3) in private, who are engaged in (4) safe, (5) sodomy 
that (6) does not bear the affirmative sanction of the government.  The use of vibrators 
and other sex aids meets most of these criteria.175 
Specifically, statutes concerning sexual devices legislate situations involves 
the use by (1) at least one consenting (2) adult (3) acting in private, of an 
aid that is (4) safe, and (6) no affirmative government sanction is sought.176  
The value of this juxtaposition turns on two fundamental assumptions: 
burdening commerce in an item is the same as prohibiting its use and the 
Lawrence decision’s protection is not predicated on the act of sodomy. 
The first assumption seems easy enough to prove, but not from 
Lawrence.  Lawrence protects against at least some laws directed at private 
action as a means of discouraging public conduct.  The issue in Reliable 
and Williams involves prohibition of public conduct to discourage private 
action; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey177 
controls.  Casey clearly indicates that burdening the access to a product is 
essentially identical to proscribing its use, a fact that both the Williams and 
Reliable courts recognized.178  The question, then, becomes whether the 
state can proscribe use, which, in turn, rests on the second assumption 
concerning the extent of Lawrence’s protection. 
What Lawrence protects is dependent on, and so is as muddled as, the 
means by which the Court reached its decision.  The Court never uses the 
phrase “fundamental right,”179 but it does use “legitimate state interest,”180 
 
174 Sunstein, supra note 164, at 28. 
175 Herald, supra note 28, at 33-34.  That sexual devices can be used in sodomy is clear, 
but they are neither particular nor essential to sodomy, and therefore that element is omitted 
from this analysis. 
176 Id. at 34 (“With regard to . . . Lawrence, then, the use of sex aids is different only in 
the nature of the private sexual act.”) (emphasis added). 
177 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
178 See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2004); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2008).  Casey is not 
nearly as clear about what delineates an undue burden from an acceptable burden. 
179 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
references to “fundamental proposition[s]” and “fundamental decisions,” but not 
“fundamental right[s]”). 
180 Id. at 578. 
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traditionally a harbinger of rational basis review.181  The Texas statute 
relied on moral disapproval of homosexuals rather than of sodomy, 
specifically, and it sought to curtail only homosexual sodomy with a ban 
directed strictly at gay people.182  Thus, the statute furthered no legitimate 
state interest.183 
If pure rational basis review is all that Lawrence demands, the 
Williams court reached the correct conclusion.  Rational basis is an 
extremely deferential standard.  Each of the several possible state goals 
listed by the Williams courts are legitimate state interests.184  The only 
question is whether the statute is a reasonable means of achieving those 
goals.  Though the Williams I court suggested it was not,185 every 
subsequent Williams court found or assumed that the statute passes this low 
bar. 
Interestingly, because the Texas statute burdens use in a way that the 
Alabama statute does not, the Reliable court could have also reached the 
correct conclusion under rational basis review.  First, the Reliable court 
noted that, because of the breadth of the Texas statute’s prohibition, the 
restriction amounts to a ban on use, which eliminates public morality as a 
solitary legitimate state interest.186  The only remaining legitimate 
interest—protecting citizens from exposure to offensive materials—fails the 
reasonable relation test.  The court stressed that those offended or harmed 
by commerce in sexual devices would have to come to the nuisance.187  
However, had the court relied only on rational basis review, its decision 
would have gone too far.  The court could have severed the restrictions on 
giving and borrowing, thereby diminishing the statute’s burden and 
reestablishing morality as a legitimate state interest.188  The Reliable court 
 
181 See id. at 586, 599.  But see Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of 
Substantive Due Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 27-28 (2005) (cautioning against 
attaching significance to “legitimate,” noting, Justice Douglas’s use of “legitimate” while 
establishing a fundamental right in Griswold). 
182 See Coles, supra note 181, at 28-29 (“Sodomy was perfectly acceptable when 
practiced by ninety to ninety-six percent of Texans. . . . It was only wrong when performed 
by same-sex couples.”). 
183 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
184 See Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1285-87 (N.D. Ala. 1999). 
185 See id. at 1288-93. 
186 See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. 
187 See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2008). 
188 When the statute has no explicit severability provision, courts will often infer such 
power.  See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 
(2006) (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to 
limit the solution to the problem.  We prefer, for example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional 
applications of a statute while leaving the other applications in force, or to sever its 
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact[.]”) (citations omitted).  Courts 
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may not have considered this option because the basis of its decision, dicta 
about rational bases notwithstanding, is the belief that Lawrence did not 
rely on rational basis. 
Just as the Lawrence Court failed to use the key strict scrutiny phrases, 
it also failed to use key rational basis phrases, such as “minimum scrutiny,” 
“arbitrary,” “irrational,” or “strong presumption of validity.”189  In fact, in 
the same sentence of the opinion that “legitimate state interest” appears, 
“justify” also appears.190  Traditional rational basis review is so deferential 
that “justifications” for intrusions into individuals’ lives are not implicated; 
it queries the legitimacy of the state’s purpose without regard to the 
individual.191  Furthermore, the Lawrence Court adopts Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Bowers as “controlling” in this case.192  Each of the due process 
cases that Stevens relies on in his Bowers dissent are strict scrutiny cases.193  
The major missing indicator of strict scrutiny, aside from key phrases, 
is a Glucksberg analysis of fundamental rights.194  But such an analysis is 
not necessary if the right at issue is one established in a previous line of 
cases.195  The Court explicitly situates Lawrence in the mold of Griswold 
and Eisenstadt, cases protecting the sacred space of relationships.196  It is 
argued that the Court decided in Lawrence that “gay people have the same 
 
sometimes will not sever, even in the face of an explicit severability clause, if they find the 
severance to be against the intention of the legislature.  See, e.g., Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1013-16 (1983) (Rehnquist & White, JJ., 
dissenting).  However, there is no indication here that the Fifth Circuit even entertained such 
an inquiry, and the goal of the statute seems to be furthered by a continued ban on 
commerce. 
189 Coles, supra note 181, at 30. 
190 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.”) (emphasis added). 
191 Coles, supra note 181, at 30.  But see Case, supra note 165, at 83-84 (noting that the 
majority says “which can justify” rather than “that can justify,” the former being a non-
restrictive clause and so parenthetical, leading to the conclusion that despite the appearance 
of “justify,” Lawrence still only applied rational basis review). 
192 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
193 See Coles, supra note 181. 
194 Id. at 32. 
195 See id. at 34 (citing several instances where the court did not undertake a fundamental 
right analysis when relying on a previously acknowledged fundamental right). 
196 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65; see David Cruz, The “Sexual Freedom Cases?” 
Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 
318 (2000) (suggesting these opinions most accurately portray a broader right to sex or 
“‘freedom to engage in . . . sexual intercourse without fear of familial or reproductive 
consequences’” (quoting Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald 
Dworkin’s Freedom’s Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1325 (1997))). 
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[fundamental] right to intimate relationships recognized in Griswold.”197  
But what of couples, married and unmarried, or individuals interested in 
sexual devices?  According to this analysis, the Fifth Circuit was correct as 
it explicitly noted that Lawrence applied and extended a pre-existing 
right.198  The Eleventh Circuit’s error is not necessarily fatal, however, 
since Alabama does not burden every means of attaining the devices.199  By 
contrast, the Texas statute cuts off all avenues of procuring sexual devices 
and so may “unduly burden” couples’ privacy rights.200 
Lawrence’s implication on standards of review is astonishingly 
unclear.  However, at least for the Reliable court, the implication is 
inconsequential.  Under either rational basis or strict scrutiny, its conclusion 
is justified.  Level of scrutiny may also be inconsequential to the Williams 
decision.  What Casey protects from undue burden is an otherwise facially 
acknowledged fundamental right.  As the Williams court correctly notes, the 
statute does not burden any cognizable fundamental right because, unlike 
the Texas statute, it does not prohibit use.  Before using Casey to demand 
strict scrutiny from the Williams court, critics would first have to assert that 
the fundamental right being protected is not the right to private use, but a 
right to choose the means by which to achieve orgasm.  That choice is what 
Alabama’s commercial ban burdens. 
2. The Collapsible Error & the Fundamental Right to Orgasm 
What is necessary for a successful strict scrutiny substantive due 
process claim is an assertion of sexual autonomy that focuses not on the act 
or the partner, which are already protected by precedent,201 but on the end 
(orgasm).202  This is best illustrated in terms of the collapsible error. 
Courts commit the collapsible error when they subsume an equal 
protection question (is a group, e.g., homosexuals, a suspect class?) into the 
due process question (is there an underlying fundamental right, e.g., to 
marriage?), defining the underlying interest by the targeted group (gay 
 
197 See Coles, supra note 181, at 36. 
198 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
199 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
200 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
201 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (extending privacy right to private sex 
between consenting adults); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring a right to choose 
to terminate pregnancies); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to 
choose contraception to non-married couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (declaring a right of married couples to choose contraception). 
202 See Lindemann, supra note 49, at 343 (quoting the Alabama Attorney General, who 
declared no “constitutional right to purchase a product to use in pursuit of having an 
orgasm”). 
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marriage), and then limiting their analysis to substantive due process (is 
there a fundamental right to gay marriage?).203  This error generally leads to 
substantive due process questions so narrow that they are cognizable only 
as rhetorical.204  The error also results, because of flawed analysis, in 
judicial denial of both due process and equal protection.205 
Despite its repeated, but arguably honest, attempts to frame the 
question neither too narrowly nor too broadly, the Williams court 
committed this error.206  The substantive due process question is nothing 
less than the right to unburdened pursuit of orgasm,207 but the Williams 
court conflated the class (device users) and the question (orgasm) into the 
question of whether there is a fundamental right to use sexual devices in 
pursuit of an orgasm.  The Reliable court narrowly missed committing the 
error by choosing not to define an interest at all, instead relying on the 
Lawrence Court’s statement of liberty.208 
There is a line of reasoning leading to a right to orgasm.  Griswold, 
Eisenstadt, and Roe, by not discussing abstinence and other forms of sexual 
gratification as possible alternatives, can be bases of inferring an underlying 
right to adult consensual sexual activities.209  Lawrence implicitly 
recognizes this by acknowledging sex sans procreation as a component of 
self-identity.210  As gender, sex, and social paradigms break from the 
previous male and female binary, “right to sex” and a focus on the pleasure 
of the act, rather than a procreative purpose, may emerge.211 
However, no opinion yet has enshrined sexual gratification.  What the 
Court has recognized is a right to simple, consensual sexual expression in 
 
203 Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper Methodology 
When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685 (2008). 
204 See, e.g., id. at 734-35 (“[The collapsible error] build[s] an inequality into the analysis 
ab initio [and] creates an (unconstitutional) irrebuttable presumption that the underlying right 
([e.g.,] homosexual sodomy) is not fundamental.”). 
205 Id. at 733. 
206 See Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing Women’s 
Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 285, 306 (2005) 
(claiming the Court “opportunistically replaces sexual privacy, an abstract concept[,] . . . 
with particular sexual devices”). 
207 Cf. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 
EMORY L.J. 1235, 1251 (2007) (“Due process sexual liberty requires plaintiffs to assert a 
pleasure-based rather than a therapeutic rationale.”). 
208 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
209 See Cruz, supra note 196; Angela Holt, From My Cold Dead Hands: Williams v. 
Pryor and the Constitutionality of Alabama’s Anti-Vibrator Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 927, 940-
41 (2002) (explaining the “abstinence gap” argument).  
210 Herald, supra note 28, at 29 (“The Lawrence decision disengaged sex from 
reproduction by protecting sexual relationships where procreation was not possible.”). 
211 Id. 
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private, married or not, procreative or not, in both hetero- and homosexual 
relationships.  Success under current Court doctrine would turn the critique 
on its head.  After working to separate the androcentric conflation of sex 
and orgasm,212 this criticism would have us demand their fungibility.  
Furthermore, in the cases where the Court provides due process protection 
to sexual liberty, the Court has been explicit that the interest it is protecting 
transcends sex.213  Judges define rights in sexual terms only when preparing 
to deny their existence;214 when protecting sexual liberty, judges deliver 
opinions in “grand and euphemistic nonsexual terms.”215  Thus, in Bowers, 
the Court denies a right to “homosexual sodomy,”216 while in Lawrence it 
speaks of defending a bond that is “more enduring.”217  The Lawrence 
Court struck down state interference in the formation by homosexuals of 
“serious domestic relationships,” but stopped well short of giving sex, 
pleasurable or otherwise, any social or legal status.218 
Finally, even if orgasm and its pursuit are eventually protected by 
Court doctrine, that does not immediately lead to the conclusion that 
mechanically assisted orgasm is protected.  Protected pursuit of orgasm 
coupled with a better understanding of female sexual response219 may call 
for more responsible lovers,220 but it does not directly demand access to 
 
212 See ANNIE POTTS, THE SCIENCE/FICTION OF SEX: FEMINIST DECONSTRUCTION AND THE 
VOCABULARIES OF HETEROSEX 99-100 (2002) (“[P]erhaps this embryonic idea of . . . sex 
would incorporate the ‘possibilities’ of multiple pleasures; climax would become neither the 
target nor the non-target of sex, neither the ‘terminus ad quem’ nor the origin toward which 
we struggle back, but rather it would be a supplement . . . nor would [orgasms] be mystified 
to (always) mean the only source of some peak experience and intimacy.”).  This Comment 
does not intend to over-generalize by referring to a single feminist position.  However, a poll 
of the applicability of various feminist theories would fill a paper in its own right. 
213 See Buchanan, supra note 207, at 1272-73. 
214 See id. at 1273-74 (citing as examples Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and 
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
215 Id. at 1273-74 (citing as examples Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476 (1957)). 
216 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
217 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; see also Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty 
of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1408 (2004) (noting that no information in 
the record indicates that Lawrence and his sexual partner, Garner, were in a relationship, and 
asking rhetorically, “More enduring than what?  Than sex?”). 
218 See Franke, supra note 217, at 1417. 
219 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
220 In the same sense that access to contraception is protected, but not provided in all 
forms by all methods, recognizing a right to pursuing orgasm does not demand that the state 
sanction all means of achieving orgasm. Cf. David Dolinko, Retributivism, 
Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507, 519 n.36 
(1997) (“One might well believe that the intensely pleasurable sensations accompanying 
orgasm are intrinsically good, without for a moment supposing that this suggests a duty to 
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electromechanical vibrators.  This is certainly not an attractive state of the 
law.  It protects primarily male interests even when addressing “women’s 
issues.”221  Nevertheless, it is an unavoidable consequence of modern 
substantive due process. 
However, Lawrence did not label consensual adult sexual activity as a 
fundamental right calling for strict scrutiny, nor did it simply apply rational 
basis.  Instead, “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in 
the most private of places, the home,” was described as “a personal 
relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without being 
punished as criminals.”222  It is quite possible that another line of analysis 
was at work. 
3. Blurring Standards of Scrutiny & Coercive Morality 
A final approach to Lawrence views it as one of several recent cases 
indicating that “the certainty of the dichotomy between strict scrutiny and 
[rational basis] scrutiny is breaking down.”223  Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center expressed his 
doubts that the strict/rational distinction is tenable.224  Justice Marshall, 
dissenting in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
expressed “disagreement with the Court’s rigidified approach to equal 
protection analysis.”225  Indeed, the creation of a third category, so-called 
“intermediate scrutiny,” was itself a clear signal that the Court was 
becoming dissatisfied with its categories.226  Thus, Lawrence may be the 
 
set up state institutions to dole out orgasms . . . .  There is likewise no duty on any individual 
to provide others with orgasms whenever he or she is in a position to do so.”). 
221 See discussion infra Part IV.B; cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex 
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1300 (1991) (“Women can have abortions so that 
men can have sex.”). 
222 Donald L. Beschle, Lawrence Beyond Gay Rights: Taking the Rationality 
Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes Seriously, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 237 (2005) 
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). 
223 Id. at 233; see also Barnett, supra note 156; Karlan, supra note 166, at 1450 
(suggesting Lawrence “undermines the traditional tiers of scrutiny altogether”); Calvin 
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 946 
(2004) (“[I]t is not too soon to declare that the combined effect of the methods employed by 
the Court in Lawrence and Grutter has done serious damage to the health of tiered scrutiny 
[which may be] beginning to collapse.”); Sunstein, supra note 164, at 48 (“An alternative 
reading is that the Court deliberately refused to specify its ‘tier’ of analysis because it was 
rejecting the idea of tiers altogether.”). 
224 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I have never been persuaded that 
these so-called ‘standards’ adequately explain the decisional process.”). 
225 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
226 See Beschle, supra note 222, at 223-33. 
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culmination of a “crisis in analogical reasoning.”227  If Lawrence signaled 
an explicit turn toward balancing rather than tiering, what direction do we 
have for weighing the balance when the government’s interest is morality? 
The Court in Lawrence indicates the scope of the moral dimension, 
repeatedly limiting protection to “conduct not harmful to others” and 
“absent injury to a person.”228  This would seem to imply that “state 
interests are synonymous with duties to others.”229  Two categories of 
prohibitions then become unjustifiable: those that attempt to preserve 
traditional moral or cultural practices from erosion or change and those that 
prohibit acts as inherently wrong regardless of effect on others.230  This 
does not mean that majorities must remain silent on strictly moral issues; 
rather, they are confined to resistance by “argument, incentives, and 
nongovernmental social pressure.”231  Coercion by criminal sanction 
confines both contemporary and future liberty by “freez[ing] traditional 
moral concepts.”232  In fact, coercion to virtue, a contradiction in terms,233 
directly conflicts with democratic principles by removing from minorities, 
by pain of punishment, the freedom to attempt to become a majority.234 
The issue of coercive criminal sanction does not immediately remove 
morality as any rational basis for legal prohibition.235  Rather, it insists that 
the government cannot rely solely on morality and therefore must explain, 
 
227 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992). 
228 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 572 (2003); cf. Allen, supra note 163, at 1047-
48 (noting that, of the many moralities in the world, the Lawrence Court was concerned with 
religious, traditional, and ethical dictates on behavior). 
229 Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 
19 (2007). 
230 See Beschle, supra note 222, at 264; see also Robert J. Delahunty & Antonio F. 
Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State: The Supreme Court’s Vision of the Police 
Power in the Age of Globalization, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 637, 694 (2005) (“Lawrence 
diminishes the States’ ability to use criminal law to serve expressive and educative purposes, 
tending therefore to restrict criminal law to purely instrumental uses.”). 
231 Beschle, supra note 222, at 266. 
232 Id. at 265. 
233 Id. at 268 (noting that obedience to authority is the only “virtue” that coercion 
instills). 
234 See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS 
WRONGDOING 52-53 (1988). 
235 See Allen, supra note 163, at 1053-54 (calling it “intuitive” that the Lawrence Court 
was not declaring that any reliance on morality automatically made a statute 
“constitutionally infirm”); see also Delahunty & Perez, supra note 230, at 639-40 
(explaining the “Central Tradition” of political philosophy, preserved in American 
federalism, that the State’s primary and defining attribute is as a moral community). 
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by more than simple majority preference, its employment of coercion.236  
This would shift the burden of proof to the state in cases involving sexual 
privacy.237  Of course, this is still a relatively low hurdle.  Legislatures can 
simply mask their moral motivations,238 leaving “plenty of room to cook the 
books.”239  Nevertheless, by forcing legislators to wrangle with empirical 
data, it may make them at least marginally less biased while also creating a 
clear record for their constituents and the courts.240  At the least, requiring a 
modicum of justification that goes beyond simple majority in these cases 
certainly is unlikely to make the process worse.241 
Which way do the statutes in Williams and Reliable tip the balance?  
Surprisingly, again, both courts may have been correct, if for the wrong 
reasons.  Williams VI mistakenly relies on morality alone as a rational basis 
for Alabama’s prohibition.242  However, that finding was preliminary and, 
in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, preemptive of other state justifications 
made clear in Williams I (banning public displays of obscene materials, 
banning the commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism for its own 
sake, and banning commerce in obscene material).243  Each of these 
justifications has the potential, however small, to withstand Lawrence 
coercive morality review.  In fact, the only thing Lawrence coercive 
morality immediately protects is the one thing Alabama explicitly does not 
prohibit: use. 
The Reliable court reached its conclusion by correctly applying the 
reasoning of Lawrence’s coercive morality review, although it is not clear 
that it relied on that analysis.  As the Reliable majority explicitly states, 
Lawrence did not put an end to morality-based legislation.244  Because the 
Texas statute contains additional prohibitions on borrowing and giving, it 
 
236 See Beschle, supra note 222, at 279 (indicating that Lawrence, by such an 
interpretation, “makes the rational basis requirement of the Due Process Clause more than a 
paper tiger”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582, 584-85 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (repeatedly emphasizing that a state’s interests must extend beyond simple 
morality). 
237 See Herald, supra note 28, at 35-37. 
238 Susan B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After 
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1240 (2004). 
239 Koppelman, supra note 166, at 1179. 
240 See Allen, supra note 163, at 1066; Goldberg, supra note 238 (noting that unfettered 
morality justifications give legislators “virtual carte blanche”); Herald, supra note 28, at 36-
37. 
241 Allen, supra note 163, at 1066. 
242 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
243 See id. 
244 See text accompanying supra note 104. 
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prohibited acts unrelated to the supposed harm to others.245  However, the 
Reliable court could have severed those offending provisions without doing 
harm to the statute. 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION, PATHOLOGIZING SEXUALITY, AND THE 
HIDDEN DANGERS OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY 
Much literature has arisen around the possibility that the Lawrence 
majority, like the O’Connor concurrence, may have made their decision on 
equal protection grounds but been reluctant to couch it explicitly in those 
terms.246  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states 
that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”247  Like substantive due process review, any 
discriminatory state law will be scrutinized at a level dependant on the 
nature of the classification in the statute.248  Classifications that are based on 
race, national origin, religion, or alienage warrant strict scrutiny review.249  
Gender and illegitimacy classifications warrant an “intermediate scrutiny” 
review, requiring the state to provide “exceedingly persuasive 
justification”250—important government interest furthered by substantially 
related means251—for its policy.  All other classifications, including 
homosexuality, warrant rational basis review.252  If a statute is not facially 
discriminatory, the Court requires a showing of discriminatory intent in 
equal protection claims; disparate impact is merely “evidentiary” and, 
 
245 Note that, despite having the more restrictive ban, Texas, unlike Alabama never 
advanced an interest in preventing stimulation and auto-eroticism for its own sake. 
246 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 166 (suggesting the Court was not clear on level of 
scrutiny because its decision rested on a conclusion about equality—that class-based 
animosity by definition lacks a legitimate government purpose—to undergird its analysis of 
due process, ultimately making a decision that, “sounds in equal protection” regardless of the 
Court’s “doctrinal handle”). 
247 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
248 Also like substantive due process, equal protection analysis has seen blurring of the 
review boundaries.  See Beschle, supra note 222 (arguing that the Court’s doctrine has 
evolved to eliminate the fundamental distinctions between strict, intermediate, and rational 
basis scrutiny, adopting a balancing test that compares the interests if the class and the state). 
249 See Beschle, supra note 222 (describing categories warranting different levels of 
scrutiny).  For explanation of strict scrutiny, see discussion supra Part IV.A. 
250 See Personnell Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).  
251 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
252 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).  Some states have found 
heightened scrutiny appropriate for purposes of equal protection under their state 
constitutions.  See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).  For an explanation 
of rational basis review, see discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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absent a “stark pattern,” “not determinative.”253  Indeed, the standard is so 
high that the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a facially 
neutral veteran’s preference scheme—one that excluded 98% of women.254 
The equal protection criticism of anti-sexual-device statutes255 begins 
with the recognition that intermediate scrutiny frequently fails to take into 
account important and fundamental differences between the sexes256 and, in 
its attempts to recognize or equalize those differences, the state often 
compensates in ways that compound the problem.257  Second, because 
gender discrimination by predominantly male legislatures is often a 
byproduct of conscious ignorance, benign obliviousness, or lack of self-
awareness, intentional discrimination is an impossible standard.258  The case 
of sexual devices, as the historical development of vibrators indicates, is 
 
253 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); 
see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (adopting a twofold inquiry into (1) whether a statutory 
classification is facially discriminatory and, if not, (2) whether any “adverse effect reflects 
invidious . . . discrimination”; but limiting the second inquiry as “an important starting 
point” and still requiring a showing of “purposeful discrimination”).  But see Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (critiquing the discriminatory intent standard as an 
impossibility on the Freudian and cognitive psychological grounds that such intent is often 
simultaneously both manifest and subconscious). 
254 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256. 
255 See generally Herald, supra note 28.  Though distinct from equal protection with 
regard to homosexuals, a similar argument can be made based on research noted infra notes 
264–267. 
256 See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1673 
(1997) (arguing the state’s focus on gender neutrality leads to inaction where intervention 
would best ensure equality). 
257 See LEONORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985) (noting that 
removing maternal preferences in divorce proceedings hurt women and children); Buchanan, 
supra note 207 (arguing that the government’s reliance on the differences between men and 
pregnant women, inter alia, effectively “enforces traditional gender roles by binding women 
to reproductive consequences of heterosexual activity while excusing men”). 
258 See Herald, supra note 28, at 22; Lawrence, supra note 253; Michael Selmi, Proving 
Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 296-
324 (1997) (finding current precedent to require proving that the “only plausible conclusion” 
is discriminatory intent); Gila Stopler, “A Rank Usurpation of Power”—The Role of 
Patriarchal Religion and Culture in the Subordination of Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 365, 366 (2008) (“Liberalism disregards the institutions, practices, discourses, and 
norms of a religion or culture as a socially and politically significant site of power, which 
severely curtails its ability to ensure that the exercise of power and authority over the 
individual is justified and that the rights of the individual are safeguarded.”); Waldman & 
Herald, supra note 206, at 287 (stating that “stereotypical thinking and cognitive biases lead 
to a skewed ‘database’ that undergirds legal doctrines that disadvantage women,” and that 
“recent advances in cognitive psychology suggest that most discriminatory behavior results 
from . . . processes that occur far beyond the reach of the conscious self”). 
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just such a situation where legitimate differences between men and women 
are smoothed over by facially neutral laws that are impossible to challenge, 
despite their disparate impact, because of the lack of clear ill motive.259  
With a proper understanding of the androcentrism within which the statutes 
are situated, the state of Alabama’s position can be seen as arguing that 
sexual devices that are either free, borrowed, imported, or mislabeled are 
not a threat to morality or traditional sexual roles.260  In this way, the state 
accurately describes, with clarity and no sense of irony, the irrationality of 
the statute’s operation.261  Thus, according to the equal protection critique, a 
new method of addressing legitimate equal protection concerns is called 
for.262 
Scientific research into female sexuality and sexual response is scant, 
with most investigations consisting of extended studies of men and the later 
assumption that the same is true of women.263  This is true despite studies 
that indicate that most women do not climax from penetration,264 nearly half 
of women use sexual devices,265 sexual devices are used primarily by 
 
259 Cf. Buchanan, supra note 207, at 1241 (“The legal coercion of sexual morality is 
typically interpreted in a way that requires the control, surveillance, and punishment of 
women, but rarely of men.”). 
260 See Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 305. 
261 Id. 
262 Cf. NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 26 (1989) (interpreting Foucault to say that “if power is 
instantiated in mundane social practices and relations, then efforts to dismantle or transform 
the regime must address those practices and relations”). 
263 See Medical Research Lacks Female Participants, MED. ETHICS ADVISOR, Aug. 1, 
2004, at 91-92 (quoting a Society for Women’s Health Research leader saying “[f]or a long 
time in medicine, we had this thing called the ‘male norm[:]’ [i]t was just assumed that the 
male was ‘normal’ and women were just small men with different plumbing and a hormone 
problem”); Cynthia Gorney, Designing Women: Scientists and Capitalists Dream of Finding 
a Drug that Could Boost Female Sexuality, There’s One Little Problem . . . , WASH. POST, 
Jun. 30, 2002, at W8 (quoting a research psychologist saying psychology articles “go on and 
on about male sexuality, and there are all the diagnostic measures, and so on.  And then they 
say something in two sentences, akin to: ‘and we assume the same thing is true for 
women’”); cf. Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 295 (“The female is defined in relation 
to the male, her sexuality governed by male needs.”). 
264 BARRY R. KOMISARUK ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF ORGASM 71 (2006); DESMOND MORRIS, 
THE NAKED WOMAN: A STUDY OF THE FEMALE BODY 213 (2005) (putting the number as high 
as two out of every three women). 
265 See, e.g., BERMAN CTR., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SEXUAL AIDS & DEVICES: A 
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO SATISFACTION AND QUALITY OF LIFE 
(2004), available at http://www.sexlibido.cz/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=V2SwJSfzUsM%3D 
(finding the 44% of 2,594 women between eighteen and sixty years of age have used a 
sexual device; 20% self-stimulate at least once a week; of those, 60% use a device to do so); 
see also DUREX, GIVE AND RECEIVE: 2005 GLOBAL SEX SURVEY RESULTS (2005), available at 
http://www.data360.org/pdf/20070416064139.Global%20Sex%20Survey.pdf (finding that 
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women,266 and by lesbian women in particular.267  Indeed, almost all of the 
appellants in Williams are women, with the only men involved being either 
husbands of or business co-owners with female petitioners.268  However, 
because there is no indication of purposeful discrimination, women have 
been forced to challenge the statutes on medical and therapeutic claims of 
substantive due process.269 
These litigation strategies only serve to reinforce existing biases 
toward women and female sexuality by insinuating that female sexual 
gratification is not an acceptable objective in its own right.270  Furthermore, 
they support a standard that, because of its focus on the application of each 
individual device, makes general support of sexual devices impossible.271  
Courts recognize the validity of the devices only if the device is for medical 
or therapeutic purposes.272  This, in turn, forces women who use these 
 
43% of respondents in the United States have used a vibrator, compared to 19% of 
respondents that have used no sex enhancers).  The author is aware of selection biases in the 
Durex survey; the shortcomings of the survey highlight the state of research in the field. 
266 See Durex, supra note 265 (finding that vibrators “are more popular among women 
than men—26% compared to 19%,” a comparative disparity of almost 40%). 
267 Clive M. Davis et al., Characteristics of Vibrator Use Among Women, 33 J. SEX RES. 
313, 316 (1996) (finding that, by age twenty, 36% of lesbian respondents had used a 
vibrator, compared to 11% of heterosexual women; by age thirty, 86% of lesbian 
respondents had used a vibrator). 
268 See Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1261-64 (N.D. Ala. 1999).  
The appellant in Reliable was a corporation. 
269 See discussion supra Part IV.A; Lindemann, supra note 49, at 338 (“The challengers 
argue predominantly not for the rights of sexually-healthy women but for those with 
dysfunctions that require physical therapy.”); Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 310 
(“In the medical profession, . . . female sexuality [is defined] as successful when it responds 
well to the needs of men, and as dysfunctional when it does not.  In the legal arena, sadly, 
the most successful cases . . . are those where the courts can be convinced to consider the 
needs of these dysfunctional women . . . .”). 
270 See Yakaré-Oulé Jansen, The Right to Freely Have Sex? Beyond Biology: 
Reproductive Rights and Sexual Self-Determination, 40 AKRON L. REV. 311, 319 (2007) 
(arguing that “a focus on women reduced to ‘suffering bodies in need of protection by the 
law and by the State’ can frustrate more fundamental goals, such as women’s need for 
participation and equality” (quoting Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women, 
and Human Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM. 
RTS.: INT’L J. 16, 25 (2004))); Lindemann, supra note 49, at 344 (noting that this is 
“precisely the same message that the statutes themselves sent in their discouragement of 
autonomous female sexuality”). 
271 Cf. Lindemann, supra note 49, at 337 (quoting Dr. Sandor Gardos’s paraphrasing of 
his testimony in Sewell v. State, 233 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1977), as: “DA: Now Professor Doctor 
Gardos, you stated that these devices have therapeutic value.  Is that Correct?  Gardos: Yes.  
DA: And have you ever prescribed a device similar to this one?  Gardos: Uh, no, I must 
admit that I have never prescribed that a patient attach a dildo to his or her chin”). 
272 Herald, supra note 28, at 24. 
590 Richard Glover [Vol. 100 
devices into the Morton’s Fork of admitting that they are either sick or 
criminal in the eyes of the law.273 
However, the few studies of female sexuality that exist show that 
sexual dysfunction is more prevalent in women than men,274 with at least 
43% and as many as 90% of women experiencing sexual problems.275  This 
seems to indicate that the “dysfunction” is actually natural, a byproduct of 
lack of understanding of female sexuality.276  Some critics seize on this 
while pointing out the legality of products, like Viagra, that treat male 
sexual dysfunction, to suggest discriminatory intent.277  Certainly, there 
have been upsetting juxtapositions of male and female therapeutic drugs 
before,278 but the critics’ argument is self-defeating in this context.  Viagra 
and other virility drugs—which are blood flow enhancers, not mechanical 
devices—are regulated.  Furthermore, the obscenity statutes ban the sale 
and distribution of other male sexual aids, such as “cock-rings.”  Finally, 
attacks on the technical details of the statute as over- or under-inclusive or 
lacking specificity279 do nothing to directly promote the fundamental 
 
273 See id. 
274 See Edward O. Laumann et al., Sexual Dysfunction in the United States: Prevalence 
and Predictors, 281 JAMA 537, 541 (1999). 
275 See MAINES, supra note 12, at 61 (noting early studies showing rates of 60-90%); 
Kevin L. Billups, The Role of Mechanical Devices in Treating Female Sexual Dysfunction 
and Enhancing the Female Sexual Response, 20 WORLD J. UROLOGY 137, 137-41 (2002) 
(showing a rate of 43%).  But see MAINES, supra note 12, at 63-66 (noting the clear potential 
to interpret the existing data in the opposite direction). 
276 See SHERE HITE, THE HITE REPORT: A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF FEMALE SEXUALITY 236 
(1976) (“Even the question being asked is wrong . . . [t]he question should not be: Why 
aren’t women having orgasms from intercourse?  But, rather: Why have we insisted women 
should orgasm from intercourse?”); Herald, supra note 28, at 25.  Contra BERGLER & 
KROGER, KINSEY’S MYTH OF FEMALE SEXUALITY 48 (1954) (claiming, almost laughably, that 
there is no scientific or statistical objection to declaring 80-90% of the female population 
abnormal).  Despite this, few sex specific studies have occurred.  See Waldman & Herald, 
supra note 206, at 299 (“[T]he reasons behind women’s lack of sexual responsiveness have 
not generated much scientific inquiry . . . .  Rather [these statistics on “normalcy”] have been 
met with bland acceptance.”). 
277 See, e.g., Shelly Elimelekh, Note, The Constitutional Validity of Circuit Court 
Opinions Limiting the American Right to Sexual Privacy, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
261, 287 (2006) (suggesting that “it is difficult to demarcate the difference between sex toys 
and sex drugs, yet the government has clearly drawn this distinction”); cf. Sarah E. Bycott, 
Controversy Aroused: North Carolina Mandates Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives in 
the Wake of Viagra, 79 N.C. L. REV. 779. 797 (2001) (discussing the distinction between 
Viagra as “medically necessary,” versus contraceptives as “life-enhancing”). 
278 See, e.g., Virginia Postrel, Sex Mandates, FORBES, May 31, 1999, at 121 (quoting a 
Reverend’s characterization of mandatory contraceptive coverage as “disgusting and 
demoralizing,” whereas Viagra “enhances a natural function”). 
279 See, e.g., Elimelekh, supra note 277, at 287-88. 
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underlying principle of sexual autonomy and recognition of natural female 
sexual response. 
A similar attack juxtaposes the Court’s open acceptance and protection 
of “normal, healthy” non-procreative sexual pleasure—mainstream 
pornography, effectively defined by what heterosexual men like or are 
supposed to like—with the Court’s reluctance to recognize the same non-
procreative interests of women and sexual minorities.280  To the extent that 
such a criticism highlights the fact that sexual device prohibitions 
disproportionately affect women and sexual minorities—groups less likely 
to be interested in traditional heterosexual pornographic media and more 
likely to be interested in traditionally non-expressive sexual aids281—it is 
certainly valid.  However, the claim that bans on sexual devices “would 
never [have been] permitted by the standards developed to protect straight 
men’s porn”282 is not supported by either the language of the statutes 
themselves or the Court’s jurisprudential history.  Two important 
distinctions are glossed over in this criticism. 
First, the exception the Court carved out for prurient pornography was 
one for possession and use, not for production or commerce.283  Courts at all 
levels—state and federal, trial and appellate—have explicitly recognized 
that same exception for sexual devices.284  Second, although neither the 
Fifth nor Eleventh Circuits reached the First Amendment question, the 
Kansas and Mississippi Supreme Courts provide relevant analysis.  Miller 
and other First Amendment pornography cases are not applicable because 
devices are not speech or expression.285  At best, devices are symbolic 
speech, subject to the content-neutral test set forth in United States v. 
O’Brien.286  It is an unfortunate reality that pornography is more likely to 
capture heterosexual male interests than those of women and sexual 
minorities,287 and devices are more valuable to women and sexual 
 
280 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 207, at 1248-49. 
281 See supra notes 258-261 and accompanying text. 
282 Buchanan, supra note 207, at 1250. 
283 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
284 See discussion supra Part III. 
285 See State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Kan. 1990) (listing Miller-protected 
objects as “book[s], movie[s], or play[s], rather than a device”).  But see Bret Boyce, 
Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 299, 339-45 (2008) (criticizing the 
Court’s speech/conduct distinction). 
286 See PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244, 1249-50 (Miss. 2004) (citing United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
287 The claim in this Comment is not that there are no “pornographic” outlets for women 
and sexual minorities.  When it comes to pornography, the tail is long indeed.  See Tom 
Chivers, “Rule 34,” Internet Rules and Laws: The Top 10 from Godwin to Poe, THE 
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6408927/Internet-
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minorities than to heterosexual men; but it is far from per se evidence of an 
“insidious [legal] double standard.”288  Rather, the observation suggests 
that, with proper scientific support, our understanding of “normal, healthy” 
sexual behavior in women may require a change in, not an extension of, our 
current protections of sexual expression.289  Such a change would be an 
inappropriate undertaking for a district or circuit court.290 
A final criticism suggests that these statutes stigmatize in the same 
way that the one at issue in Lawrence did.291  This is patently false.  
Lawrence was concerned in relevant part with the fact that, due to the 
statute, merely being homosexual was taken by employers and the public as 
a tacit admission of criminality.292  Here, there can be no such inference as 
one can be homosexual, heterosexual, married, in a relationship, or single 
and still have use for such devices.  Though these statutes stigmatize by 
criminalizing the sale of devices utilized in arguably “normal” sexual 
conduct, there is no de facto public characterization of all potential device 
users (literally every member of the community) as criminal or sick.  The 
characterization is a personal one incumbent on the individual device user 
to make.  This may be no less damaging to the psyche, but it is 
fundamentally different from the stigma Lawrence was concerned with. 
As detrimental and disturbing as the pathologizing of female sexuality 
may be, the scarcity and narrowness of scientific studies, both of “normal” 
sexual response and the role of sexual devices,293 counsels against taking 
major steps on these grounds.  Court imposition prior to commission and 
completion of better and more thorough research runs the risk of making 
the issue dead letter prior to any enlightenment.294  Furthermore, if such 
 
rules-and-laws-the-top-10-from-Godwin-to-Poe.html; Wikipedia, 34 (Number): In Other 
Fields—Rule 34, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/34_(number)#In_other_fields (last visited Feb. 
6, 2010).  Instead, this Comment claims that, by volume, the overwhelming majority of 
pornography is tailored to heterosexual male interests. 
288 Tristan Taormino, Dallas Dildo Defiance, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 17, 2002, available at 
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0221/taormino.php. 
289 See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing potential First Amendment protections of 
sexual expression). 
290 Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
addressing the First Amendment implications of Lawrence for this issue would be 
premature). 
291 See, e.g., Herald, supra note 28, at 34 (“[T]hat same stigma is present here.”). 
292 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581-82 (2003). 
293 See Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 303 (characterizing the state of relevant 
scientific study as “inaccurate or incomplete”). 
294 See Franke, supra note 217, at 1415-18 (warning of the compartmentalizing nature of 
judicial solutions and comparing the restrictive effect of Lawrence on the efforts of 
homosexual rights activists to the effect of Brown on the “black civil rights movement”); 
Susana T. Fried & Ilana Landsberg-Lewis, Sexual Rights: From Concept to Strategy, in 3 
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studies do occur despite a Court decision invalidating obscenity statutes, 
any discrepancy between the studies’ findings and the Court’s reasoning 
would endanger the entire ruling.  Finally, as the legislative and judicial 
struggles over the proper role of homosexuality in modern society show, 
backlash to changes previously thought to be relatively innocuous can be 
both discouraging and dangerous.295  These are the growing pangs of any 
expansion of cultural consciousness, but it would be best to enter the fray 
with as much validating research as possible.  Furthermore, exactly as the 
Williams IV court indicates, the scarcity of device bans and the reluctance 
of states to amend those bans where they are declared unconstitutional on 
technicalities indicate that the democratic process has been successful and 
may be superior for these ends.296  Though this is hardly reassuring to 
people who benefit greatly from the use of sexual devices, achieving 
“victory” too early only leaves open doors that may invite failure in the 
future.297 
Regardless, neither of the appellate courts that have considered the 
issue have made their decisions on these grounds, nor can they.  What the 
critique demands is an expansion of equal protection with respect to gender 
generally and sexuality specifically.  Within the courts, only the Supreme 
Court can achieve that end.  To the extent that the critique is correct, the 
circuit split is ideal for the Court to clarify, expand, and empower both 
Lawrence and equal protection jurisprudence.  However, that will be 
 
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 114, 114 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean 
Koenig eds., 2001) (calling to “sustain the fluidity of the concept and its ability to include an 
ever-growing understanding of the range of experiences . . . to expand the boundaries of 
what sexual rights mean, rather than limiting its application and meaning with over-
definition”); Jansen, supra note 270, at 334 (noting the “risk of excluding” that would fatally 
limit a declaration of sexual rights). 
295 See Case, supra note 165, at 79-81 (recalling, in this “Kulturkampf,” that Clinton’s 
modest achievements for homosexuals in the military were followed by more involuntary 
discharges than ever; Boulder’s antidiscrimination ordinance led to Amendment 2; the 
Hawaii Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decision led to the Defense of Marriage Act and 
a Hawaiian constitutional amendment; and that “Lawrence itself seems to have sparked 
intensified interest in a federal constitutional amendment on same-sex marriage and a sharp 
decline in support in the polls for gay rights;” not to mention the experience in Britain, 
which the Lawrence majority cited as a shining example, of “more virulent prosecution of 
public homosexual acts” coupled with “a very narrow definition of what was ‘private’ and 
hence not criminal”). 
296 See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1244 n.14 (11th Cir. 
2004).  Critics may argue that statutes like the one at issue in Lawrence were rare as well.  
However, that fails to account for the foregoing arguments distinguishing the 
unconstitutionality of anti-sodomy laws and the constitutionality of these statutes. 
297 Cf. MAINES, supra note 12, at 66 (indicating, ironically, that legalizing vibrators 
actually enforces the androcentric view because it relieves men of responsibility for 
stimulating the clitoris). 
594 Richard Glover [Vol. 100 
impossible on this round of litigation, as the Texas attorney general has 
decided not to petition for a writ of certiorari in Reliable.298 
C. FIRST AMENDMENT: PORNOGRAPHY, PROCREATION, AND SEXUAL 
EXPRESSION299 
Though there is a dearth of judicial and academic support for First 
Amendment protection of sexual expression,300 it is possible that Lawrence 
was a watershed decision clarifying just such a safeguard.301  The Court’s 
due process protection of private, sexual relationships began with a marital 
procreative liberty found scattered throughout the Constitution.302  Though 
the Court eventually extended the safeguard to non-marital relationships, 
the Court did not protect sexual relationships generally.303  Similarly, the 
Court began its protection of private sexual speech and expression with “the 
weight of the United States’ ‘whole constitutional heritage.’”304  
Specifically, the Court protected a man’s private collection of pornography 
as an extension of his liberty to pursue happiness in order to safeguard his 
intellect and emotions.305  However, the Court did not protect pornography 
generally as an expressive outlet, thereby allowing governments to regulate 
 
298 See Kandyba, supra note 129. 
299 This Section focuses on Lawrence’s potentially instructive impact on the First 
Amendment’s protection of speech and expression.  Scholars have argued that statutes such 
as the one in question may also violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2005).  Such 
an argument is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
300 See James Allon Garland, Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law Has Failed to 
Recognize Sex as Expressive Conduct Under the First Amendment, and Why Sex Between 
Men Proves that It Should, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 159, 164 n.27, 195-203 (2003) 
(summarizing the scholarship and the law prior to Lawrence). 
301 See Allen, supra note 163, at 1062 (“Lawrence has significantly undermined the very 
foundation upon which the Court has built the obscenity doctrine . . . [and so] requires a 
reevaluation of the doctrine.”); James Allon Garland, Sex as a Form of Gender and 
Expression After Lawrence v. Texas, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 297, 299 (2006) (describing 
the Lawrence decision as “not only a potential doctrinal watershed, [but also] utterly 
touching”).  Contra Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and Harm: Why 
Miller Should Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 611 (2008). 
302 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1965) (referencing the 
“emanations” from “penumbras” of several Amendments in the Bill of Rights). 
303 See Garland, supra note 297, at 297 (calling Lawrence the Court’s first opinion not 
only to recognize same-sex intimacy but also to approve of sex without any reference to 
procreation). 
304 See id. at 301 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)). 
305 See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65; Garland, supra note 301, at 302 (“The Court 
concluded that governmental intrusion ‘into the contents of his library’ (of porn) endangered 
not only his thoughts but his ‘emotions and sensations’ and, thus, his right to ‘satisfy his 
intellectual and emotional needs’ (for porn).”) (citations omitted). 
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it in a manner inconsistent with free expression.306  Thus, with regard to sex 
prior to Lawrence, the Court had created a “pornographic-procreative 
dyad”: two outlets of desire, linked by sex, that had achieved limited 
protection without implicating the value or meaning of the expressive act 
that undergirds them.307  Against this backdrop, Lawrence recognized the 
protection previously framed in terms of procreation instead as one of 
intimacy that ultimately finds its expression in sex.308  It may have reframed 
the pornographic portion of the dyad as well.309 
Rather than extending its previous discussions of sex as 
“mysterious,”310 “sensitive,” and “key” to human existence,311 the Lawrence 
majority focuses on the relationship, framing sex as one “expressi[ve]” 
component.312  The Court never references the First Amendment directly or 
any of its jurisprudence on that topic.313  However, it does discuss, in 
language quite similar to its opinion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,314 
“intimate and personal choices” that “define one’s own concept of 
existence.”315  Sex that is “intimate,” “personal,” and private may not 
intuitively seem communicative, but speech can be expressive without an 
audience.316  Furthermore, if sex is regarded as an expressive speech act, the 
fact that the action in question is illegal is not dispositive of its 
protection.317 
Some critics argue that only traditional coital sex expresses appropriate 
values.318  However, this is precisely the kind of monopolization of ideas 
against which First Amendment protections of speech and expression 
 
306 See Garland, supra note 301, at 302 (noting that in other contexts, for example flag 
burning, claims that expressive conduct is “offensive” have been declared unconstitutional 
attempts to monopolize ideas). 
307 Id. at 303. 
308 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 574, 577-78 (2003). 
309 See generally Garland, supra note 301. 
310 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). 
311 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). 
312 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
313 See Garland, supra note 301, at 304. 
314 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
315 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 851 (1992)). 
316 Garland, supra note 301, at 298 (citing, inter alia, Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 656). 
317 Id. at 305; City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283, 289 (2000) (plurality) 
(holding that despite bans on nudity as a summary offense, nude dancing is still entitled to 
First Amendment protection); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563-66 (1991) 
(finding that a misdemeanor offense is still entitled to First Amendment protection). 
318 See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1049 (1994). 
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defend.319  That similar sex acts can express a wide variety of messages320 
does not eliminate their protection.  The parties involved in the expression 
define the expression,321 and speech acts are protected no matter how 
“bizarre,”322 “abstract[,] or perplexing.”323  This does not mean that there 
can be no interference with sex as an expressive act; a compelling 
government interest can overcome the citizen’s speech right.324  However, 
the government cannot object to the outward expressions of some 
relationships simply because an unpopular sex act is assumed to be part of 
it.325 
Nevertheless, the indecisive language in Lawrence provides at best a 
tenuous link to a supposed watershed in First Amendment civil liberties.  It 
is certainly not the kind of language that a circuit court can justify seizing 
when considering cases with long lines of precedent.326  Further 
clarification from the Court is absolutely essential to a defensible claim for 
sexual devices as a necessary component of protected sexual expression. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The world has been so male-centered for so long, it is no wonder that judges find it 
difficult to do the archaeological work necessary to unearth the biases.  Even more 
destructive, however, is that courts show a willingness to cover biased rules in neutral 
rhetoric, thus bubble wrapping the problem with even more layers of protection.  By 
returning to an analysis of substantive due process that protects only those rights 
historically protected, the court’s ‘neutral’ analysis disfavors women who have for 
 
319 Garland, supra note 301, at 298. 
320 Id. at 316-17 (“[S]cientific evidence shows that overwhelming majorities of 
Americans engage in sex to express love and to feel loved in return.  By no means does this 
indicate that sex for pleasure . . . lacks expression.  Sexual contact can show an 
understanding of a partner’s needs or appreciation of a part of the body.  Group sex can 
celebrate the rejection of social mores, and even autonomous sex can have educational and 
other creativity values.” (citations omitted)). 
321 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). 
322 Id. at 410. 
323 Garland, supra note 301, at 298 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Bost., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)). 
324 See Allen, supra note 163, at 1063-64 (arguing that localities would often easily be 
able to meet such a standard, citing protection of minors as justification for child 
pornography prohibitions and zoning of adult businesses). 
325 See Garland, supra note 301, at 317-18.  This Comment does not contend that either 
sodomy or sex toys are, in fact, unpopular. 
326 Cf. United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing 
a district court’s finding that Lawrence eliminated morality as a justification for obscenity 
laws because of the doctrine that inferior courts may not determine that a directly applicable 
Supreme Court precedent has been undermined by a later decision of the Court). 
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centuries been the victims of both biased rules and stereotypical thinking, including 
the longstanding inertia in the medical profession towards female sexuality.327 
The history of Western understanding of female sexuality, told 
specifically through the development, use, and regulation of the vibrator, 
makes clear the long-standing unequal treatment of women in social, 
medical, psychological, and legal terms.  It is a profoundly troubling tale 
that, in the United States, has culminated in a circuit split over the ability of 
male legislators to impose their views of morality and normalcy on women 
and sexual minorities by way of statutes that essentially eliminate the 
availability of the devices they prefer, and sometimes even need, for sexual 
gratification.  That much is almost universally accepted.  Even the Williams 
court indicates that the Alabama legislature’s regulation of sexual devices is 
misguided.  However, nothing in this tale of woe is a cognizable 
constitutional argument. 
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits each heard challenges to these irksome 
statutes based on the substantive due process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Though the courts came to opposite conclusions, both likely 
reached the right result, if possibly for the wrong reasons.  Because the 
Alabama statute did not eliminate access to sexual devices, it likely did not 
trigger strict scrutiny and so is a valid, reasonable exercise of the state’s 
power to regulate public morality and to protect its citizens from obscene or 
offensive materials.  Because the Texas statute criminalized all means of 
acquiring sexual devices, it properly deserved strict scrutiny and failed to 
present either a compelling government interest or a narrowly tailored 
approach.  However, contrary to the actual position of the Reliable court 
and the many scholars who have considered these decisions, there is little 
reason to believe that there is a constitutional demand hidden in Lawrence 
that required the Fifth Circuit to announce a new right to sexual privacy.  
The Reliable court and its supporting scholars appear, ironically, to have 
engaged Occam’s dildo328 in their push for what may be described as 
justice, but cannot be described as constitutional law. 
Neither circuit was asked to consider the equal protection implications 
of the statutes, and for good reason.  While there is clearly a disparate and 
arguably devastating impact of these statutes on women and sexual 
minorities, current equal protection doctrine cannot recognize that claim.  
Similarly, though there may be a glimmer of hope in free expression 
doctrine coupled with the Court’s vague statements in Lawrence, there is 
 
327 Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 307-08. 
328 See Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists, 18 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 369, 372 n.9 (1995) (“While Occam’s razor requires that of two competing 
explanations the simplest be selected, Occam’s dildo predicts that the most titillating of the 
two explanations will be preferred.”). 
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not yet any solid First Amendment avenue to challenging the statutes.  
Those limitations may indicate flaws in the system—only time and future 
rulings of the Supreme Court will tell. 
However, that does not mean there is nothing to be done.  The current 
state of scientific research into female sexuality and orgasm is extremely 
limited.  This helps to mask the damage being done by the seemingly 
neutral laws in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.  Better and more 
thorough medical and psychological investigations of female sexuality are 
absolutely essential to the future of this fight.  Better understanding will 
force legislatures to consciously grapple with the effects of their outdated 
preconceptions.  Failing that, it may push or even empower the Supreme 
Court to clarify Lawrence’s meaning for substantive due process, equal 
protection, and the First Amendment in a way that is more protective of 
women’s rights.  The above quote decries the ability of the Court to cloak 
itself in neutrality when applying invidious bias.  This is only possible in 
this context to the extent that scientific and medical understanding of 
female sexuality isnon-representative, incomplete, and inconclusive.  The 
responsibility, therefore, falls to physicians, psychiatrists, and the people to 
perform more and better research and, ultimately, to demand a reckoning, 
whether legislative or judicial. 
 
